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INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, the relationship between legislative and judicial

control of federal administrative discretion has changed dramatically. In
the 1960s and 1970s, Congress continued its long tradition of transferring authority to administrative agencies in broad and relatively standardless delegations.' During that period, administrative discretion was
constrained by activist judicial review, which was based on whatever leg-

islative intent courts could discern in the vague statutes empowering
agencies to act. 2 In the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court has adopted

a more restrained approach to the review of administrative decisions, re* John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.S., 1970, J.D., 1973, University of Pennsylvania.
** Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B., 1973, Union College; M.A., 1974, Harvard
University; J.D., 1977, Cornell University.
The authors wish to thank Christopher Schroeder of the Duke University School of Law and
Patrick Gudridge of the University of Miami School of Law for permitting them to present a preliminary version of this Article in seminars conducted at those two institutions. The authors appreciate
the many constructive comments made by those who attended the two seminars. The authors also
appreciate the comments of Richard Pierce, Peter Strauss, and Cass Sunstein. Acknowledgment is
due to Diane Bringus and Nancy Wilson, who provided invaluable research assistance at various
stages in the preparation of this Article. Finally, the authors gratefully acknowledge the support of
the University of Kansas General Research Fund for assisting in financing the research necessary to
develop this Article.
1. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. Although such delegations imposed relatively
few front-end constraints on agency discretion, Congress had the power to supervise agency discretion by use of the legislative veto. This back-end tool for controlling agency discretion was eliminated when the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto. See infra notes 126-28 and
accompanying text.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 117-25.
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stricting or eliminating almost all of the activist techniques previously
employed to police agency discretion.3 At the same time, Congress has
increasingly resorted to narrow and specific legislative grants of authority, especially, although not exclusively, in the area of environmental
law. 4 Thus, just as Congress has expanded its efforts to confine administrative discretion at the beginning of the agency decisionmaking process,
judicial willingness to confine agency discretion at the culmination of
that process has declined.
The recent congressional attempts to reduce agency discretion confound earlier theories that Congress would not narrow administrative
discretion through specific legislation unless the Supreme Court began to
invalidate vague and standardless legislation as a violation of the constitutional prohibition on excessive delegation of legislative authority, commonly known as the nondelegation doctrine.5 Although the Court has
not invalidated any statute under the nondelegation doctrine since the
1930s,6 its adoption of restraint-oriented judicial review gives Congress
the same impetus to legislate more specifically. Absent such specific legislation, agency discretion could expand greatly in the absence of either
legislative or judicial controls.
Remarkably, Congress has yet to fully analyze the effects that the
Court's more restrained approach to review will have on the scope of
administrative discretion. Congress's reassertion of front-end controls
seems attributable to other factors, such as dissatisfaction with the performance and ideologies of agency personnel in the Reagan administration. 7 At most, Congress's narrower delegations are a largely
unconscious and uncoordinated response to the decline of judicial control over agency discretion.
Despite Congress's failure to recognize the connection between the
Supreme Court's reduced willingness to limit agency discretion and Congress's ability to do so, we believe that such a connection exists. Accordingly, this Article systematically analyzes the potential effects of
restraint-oriented review on agency discretion. Moreover, it establishes a
framework that may enable Congress to choose the mix of legislative and
judicial controls that would maximize the possibility of successfully controlling agency discretion in a variety of legislative situations.
Superficially, the decline of activist judicial review seems to make
administrative decisionmaking more democratic, increasing control by
3. See id.
4. See infra notes 38-100 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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accountable legislators and decreasing control by a nonelected judiciary.8
The matter, however, is not so straightforward. In some areas, Congress
has not produced more specific legislation; in these cases, the switch to

restraint-oriented review has simply made administrative agencies less
accountable, despite the theoretical presence of presidential control. 9

For this reason, we believe, from both a normative and an institutional
perspective, that the Court has gone too far in its pursuit of judicial re-

straint.10 Moreover, increased legislative control is not necessarily the
appropriate response to unconfined agency discretion. Although Congress's move toward narrower and more specific forms of delegation is

generally desirable, it will not work for all substantive areas of administrative law." Accordingly, Congress must continue to rely on courts to
prevent abuses of delegated discretion.
Since the need to increase control over agency discretion may arise
in diverse situations, we recommend that Congress rely on a mixture of

more specific delegations and more active judicial review. Congress
ought to extend its use of new methods of delegation beyond the environmental law area, while carefully seeking to avoid the problems that these
methods have already created.1 2 At the same time, Congress should
reestablish by statute some of the recently abandoned techniques of ac13
tivist judicial review.
I.

THE CHANGE FROM LOOSE TO TIGHT CONTROL IN LEGISLATION

Congress has recently sought to tighten its control of administrative
discretion through a variety of legislative innovations. Although others
have noted this change, 14 it is not generally recognized that, in limiting
administrative discretion, Congress has replaced the traditional model of
agency delegation with three alternative models.
8. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 204-47 and accompanying text.
11. Political circumstances will make it difficult to produce specific delegations in some situations. Moreover, even when such delegations are possible, their inherent disadvantages may make
them an undesirable response to certain kinds of excessive agency discretion. Finally, even narrow
delegations will normally confine but not eliminate agency discretion. See infra notes 101-09 and
accompanying text.
12. See infra p. 844.
13. See infra notes 248-68 and accompanying text.
14. E.g., Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 351 (1986); Muskie, Reflections on a QuarterCentury of EnvironmentalActivism:
On PostponingDeadlines,Second-Guessing the Congress, and IgnoringProblems Until It Is Too Late,
18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,081 (1988).
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Models of Delegated Power.

When Congress creates an administrative agency, it must determine
both the agency's "regulatory discretion," or its authority to determine
whether to regulate, and its "legislative discretion," or its authority to
determine how to regulate. Congress can choose constraints that maximize or minimize each type of discretion.
The following chart indicates the possible combinations of congressional choices concerning regulatory and legislative discretion:
DISCRETIONARY

Extent

of
agency
discretion

PRESCRIPTIVE

Maximum regulatory
discretion

Maximum regulatory
discretion

Maximum legislative
discretion

Minimum legislative
discretion

COERCIVE

MINISTERIAL

Minimum regulatory
discretion

Minimum regulatory
discretion

Maximum legislative
discretion

Minimum legislative
discretion

Under the "discretionary" model, agencies have the most discretion
concerning whether and how to regulate.' 5 The "ministerial" model re-

flects minimal agency discretion concerning whether and how to regulate. 1 6 Agencies that operate under the "prescriptive" and "coercive"
models have an intermediate level of discretion. Under the prescriptive
model, an agency has broad discretion over whether to regulate, but if
the agency decides to do so, Congress specifically indicates what types of
regulation the agency must adopt.' 7 The coercive model, in contrast,
15. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) operates under the discretionary model: its decisions whether to regulate are subject only to the constraint that they not be
"arbitrary and capricious," see, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (FCC's decision not to issue regulations concerning television programs targeted at
children held not "arbitrary and capricious"), and its decisions concerning how to regulate are subject only to the constraint that they be in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity," 47 U.S.C.
§§ 303, 307 (1982).
16. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) operates under the ministerial model when it performs some of its functions under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. The
Act requires FERC to regulate the prices charged by some producers of natural gas and supplies a
formula that the agency must use to implement those price regulations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3319
(1982),
17. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) operates under the prescriptive
model when it implements portions of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
The EPA has discretion to decide whether a pollutant is sufficiently hazardous to require nationally
uniform emissions limitations. See id. § 7412(a)(1) ("hazardous air pollutant" means air pollutant
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reflects minimal agency discretion over whether to regulate, but substan18
tial agency discretion to choose the method or type of regulation.
For both political and institutional reasons, 19 Congress has until recently relied almost entirely on the discretionary model in delegating authority to regulatory agencies. 20 As a political matter, a broad delegation
of legislative authority is sometimes the only way to prevent disagreement over particular policy issues from frustrating a consensus to regulate. 2 1 As an institutional matter, Congress may lack the expertise, time,
or foresight to address policy choices involved in complex regulation and
to establish appropriate solutions.2 2 Not long ago, these political and
institutional factors were considered such significant obstacles to nondiscretionary delegations that then-Justice Rehnquist 23 and a host of comthat, "in the judgment of the Administrator," causes or may cause certain adverse health effects).
Once the EPA designates a pollutant as hazardous, however, it must issue regulations in accordance
with a statutory timetable, id. § 7412(b)(1), and its ability to consider the regulation's economic
impact in setting the appropriate degree of emissions control is limited. See NRDC v. EPA, 824
F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that EPA Administrator cannot consider cost and technological
feasibility in determining what is "safe").
18. For example, the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act require the EPA to review information on radioactive pollutants to determine whether the pollutants might endanger public health.
If the EPA makes a positive determination, it can regulate the pollutant in question under any of
three different emissions control mechanisms in the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (1982) (authorizing EPA
to regulate radioactive pollutants as criteria pollutants under section 7408, as hazardous air pollutants under section 7412, or as new stationary source emissions under section 7411).
19. See, eg., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
§ 3.4 (1985); Pierce & Shapiro, Politicaland JudicialReview of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. REV.
1175, 1203-07 (1981).
20. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 19, § 3.1, at 44 ("In most cases...
Congress has given agencies considerably more discretion by passing enabling acts that are effectively standardless."); Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1196-97 (Congress "could conceivably
exercise strict control by narrowing the range of agency discretion in the enabling legislation under
which [an agency] operates. Efforts to enact this type of legislation, however, have met with little
success.").

21. M. FIORINA, CONGRESS, KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 41-49 (1977);
Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 43-45
(1982); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 359, 366-67 (1947);
Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1197; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. RE. 1669, 1695-96 (1975).
22. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 21, at 21-24; Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 720 (1969); Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1198; Redford, Regulations Revisited, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 543, 563-64 (1976); Strock, The Congress and the President:
From Confrontationto Creative Tension, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,006, 10,006 (1987); see
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 58 (1969) ("Legislative bodies
often are not equipped-or often strongly believe that they are not equipped-to do more than to
establish a legislative framework within which administrative discretion must be left largely free.");
Stewart, supra note 21, at 1695 ("In many government endeavors it may be impossible in the nature
of the subject matter to specify with particularity the course to be followed.").
23. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 546-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (Congress's failure to specify whether Occupational Safety and Health Act requires use
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mentators 24 believed that Congress would never legislate more
specifically unless the Supreme Court reinvigorated the nondelegation
doctrine, 25 which has been moribund since the 1930S.26 Yet, despite
these predictions, Congress has begun to adopt more specific legislation,
primarily in the environmental area.
B. Adopting Alternative Models of Delegated Power.
Congress has shifted from the discretionary model of delegation to
alternative models that give less discretion to the administrative agencies.
Although most of these changes have taken place in the context of environmental legislation, Congress has the capacity to make similar changes
in other regulatory areas.
Beginning in the 1970s, Congress enacted a series of statutes to prevent deterioration of workplace and outdoor environmental quality. 27
Although these laws did not invariably contain precise directives to the
agencies charged with implementation, 28 they generally imposed greater
constraints on agency discretion than did the waves of regulatory legislaof cost/benefit analysis violates nondelegation doctrine); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
24. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132-34
(1980); J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN

GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1978); T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES 93 (2d ed. 1979); Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 21, at 63-67; Gregory,
The CongressionalResponse to NLRB v. Bildisco and the ConstitutionalSubtleties of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 245, 271-72 (1985); Mayton, The Possibilitiesof Collective Choice:
Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986
DUKE L.J. 948, 967; Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-83 (1972) (reviewing K. DAVIS,
supra note 22).
25. The doctrine interprets the constitutional provision that vests the authority to legislate in
Congress alone, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers... shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States"); see, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot
delegate legislative power ... is a principle universally recognized"), to require that Congress set
standards clearly delimiting the scope of agencies' authority to regulate. See, eg., United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
26. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (threejudge court) (Leventhal, J.). See generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 19,
§ 3.4.3 (citing post-New Deal cases refusing to invalidate legislation under nondelegation doctrine).
The last time the Supreme Court used the doctrine to strike down a statute was in A.L.A. Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
27. See, eg., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)).
28. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982) (occupational safety and health standard defined as
standard that requires "conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment").
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tion enacted during the Progressive Era and the New Deal. 29 The rea-

sons for this narrowing of agency discretion are not entirely clear, but it
may be that the progressive ideal of agencies operating as expert tribu-

nals free from the political pressures that influence legislatures has lost
30
most of its force.

The trend toward increased congressional control over agency discretion noticeably increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In particular, Congress developed alternative models for supervising the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), responding to a growing perception that the traditional discretionary model was not working well.

Congressional investigations into the EPA's implementation of the
Superfund program 3 1 convinced many legislators that traditional methods of supervising agency discretion needed change. 32 Despite the impe29. Compare Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. at 1590
(Secretary of Labor subject to statutory limitations on authority to issue new regulations and to
inspect employers and issue complaints) and Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
84 Stat. at 1676 (requiring EPA to set emission standards for new stationary sources, sources of
hazardous air pollutants, and motor vehicles) with Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982)) (FTC authorized to
bring action against any firm practicing unfair methods of competition) and Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610
(1982)) (FCC given broad power to determine prices for telephone service, to define requirements for
radio licenses and radio tower construction permits, and to promulgate new regulations).
30. See Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation ofPowers and
the Requirement of Adequate Reasons For Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.. 387, 394-95; Yellin,
Science, Technology, andAdministrative Government: InstitutionalDesignsfor EnvironmentalDecisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300, 1303 n.15 (1983).
31. The Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (popularly known as the Superfund) was
created in 1980 to assist in the cleanup of leaking, abandoned, or inactive hazardous waste disposal
sites. See Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2801 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982))
($44,000,000 per year granted to agency for specified purposes related to hazardous waste disposal),
superseded, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, §§ 204,
517, 100 Stat. 1613, 1696, 1773-74 ($250,000,000 per year granted to agency for specified purposes
related to hazardous waste disposal). See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), amended, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
at 1613.
32. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 55 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
99-253], reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2837 (noting EPA's "gross
mismanagement" of Superfund program); id. at 262, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2937 ("The entire history of the Superfund program definitively refutes the argument that
the EPA can be completely trusted to manage any discretionary Superfund cleanup schedule effectively."); id. at251, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2927 (statement of
Rep. Markey) (describing "the dismal five-year history of the Superfund program" as "a relief
etched with incompetence, mismanagement, and negligence"); H.R. REP. No. 890, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1984) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 98-890] (discussing mismanagement during
early years of Superfund); 131 CONG. REc. H 1,074 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep.
Florio) ("If someone is not performing up to expectations, there is no alternative but to establish
requirements for them to meet."); idL at H1l,115 (remarks of Rep. Mineta) (disagreeing with view
that matters such as scheduling of Superfund cleanups should be left to administrative discretion).

See generally SUBCOMMITTEE

ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
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tus provided by the Superfund investigations, this dissatisfaction was not
limited to any particular Administrator or program; 33 instead, legislators
leveled two recurring charges at the EPA. First, Congress believed that
the EPA was not acting when it should have been, or was acting too
slowly. 3 4 Second, legislators expressed a widespread concern that even

when the EPA did act, it did so in a manner inconsistent with the objectives of its authorizing legislation.3 5 These and other similar regulatory
AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE OVER EPA DocuMENTS, ABUSES IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM AND OTHER MATTERS 17-18 (Comm. Print 1984);

Florio, supra note 14, at 367-75 (reviewing steps taken by Congress to limit EPA's discretion in
choosing standards for hazardous waste cleanup).
33. Congressional concern with the breadth of the EPA's discretion predated Anne GorsuchBurford's controversial tenure as the EPA Administrator. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 194 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 95-294], reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1077, 1272-73 (describing EPA's discretion to list categories of stationary sources and hazardous air pollutants under Clean Air Act §§ 111-112, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-7412 (1982), and criticisms generated by EPA's exercise of that discretion).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 34-36 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 98198], reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5576, 5593-95 ("EPA has not been able
to comply with past statutory mandates and timetables... for virtually all of its programs."). The
EPA was criticized for its excessive delay in issuing regulations to implement the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA). See, eg., S. REP. No. 56, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 9956], reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1566, 1570-71 ("The greatest problem
with implementation of the program established by the [SDWA] is the failure of EPA to issue standards for most contaminants known or anticipated to be found in drinking water."); H.R. REP. No.
168, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1985) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 99-168] ("EPA has set few standards and has not yet regulated the many chemicals increasingly found in drinking water supplies.");
132 CONG. REC. S6291 (daily ed. May 21, 1986) (statement of Sen. Baucus) ("It is clear that a
discretionary approach of having EPA choose what and when to regulate contaminants is not working."). The EPA was also criticized for slow implementation of CERCLA, see H.R. REP. No. 99253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 255, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2930
(Superfund site cleanups move "at a snail's pace"), and of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra, pt. 1, at 70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5629 ("Incredibly, . . . almost nothing has been done to fulfill" the
EPA's statutory responsibilities concerning use of recycled materials by federal agencies.); S. REP.
No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 98-284] (EPA's process of listing
hazardous wastes "has been virtually stalled for several years."). Congress has also attacked the
EPA's implementation of the CAA, see, eg., H.R. REP. No. 95-294, supra note 33, at 187, reprinted
in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1266 (discussing need to rectify EPA's "failure to
establish adequate initial or revised standards for all categories of major stationary sources and for
certain unregulated pollutants"), and of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), see, eg., 15
U.S.C. § 2641(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (citing lack of EPA regulatory guidance and standards as reason
for continued existence and possible worsening of asbestos hazards in schools and other public and
commercial buildings).
35. For example, the EPA's regulations allegedly created unintended loopholes and exclusions.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 25, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5583.84 (describing "unwarranted" exclusion of small generators from RCRA's
hazardous waste program); id. at 39, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5598
(exemption from RCRA regulation of facilities that burn hazardous waste for energy recovery "has
led to direct threats to human health and the environment"); id. at 44, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
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deficiencies cost the EPA much of its credibility. Amid charges that the
EPA "has consistently abused the public trust, ' 36 legislators working on
environmental matters began to anticipate abuses of whatever discretion
37
Congress delegated to the EPA.
As the EPA's regulatory responsibilities came up for reauthorization in the 1980s, a consensus developed in Congress to impose two kinds
of more effective legislative controls on the EPA. In certain areas, to
combat the agency's failure to act, or failure to act promptly, Congress
removed some of the agency's regulatory discretion by mandating that
regulation meet legislatively imposed deadlines or schedules.3 8 To com-

bat the EPA's proclivity for implementing statutes in a manner contrary
to congressional intent, Congress prescribed more detailed substantive
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5603 (describing exclusion of certain land disposal facilities from corrective action and ground water monitoring requirements as "one of the most serious deficiences" in

EPA's implementation of RCRA); id. at 63, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5622 (EPA's exemption of hazardous waste disposal facilities from ground water monitoring requirements is "entirely inappropriate"). The regulations were attacked for other deficiencies in coverage as well. See, eg., S. REP. No. 99-56, supra note 34, at 5, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 1570 (noting absence of any national primary-drinking-water regulations for all
but one class of synthetic organic chemicals); S. REP. No. 98-284, supra note 34, at 4 (EPA's RCRA
regulations listing hazardous wastes do not fully address fact that some wastes are "composed of
numerous hazardous constituents"); H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 56, reprintedin
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5615 (wastes hazardous to human health and the
environment are not listed as hazardous under EPA's RCRA regulations). In some instances, legislators charged that the agency reversed previous regulatory decisions, exacerbating already severe
environmental problems. See, eg., S. REP. No. 98-284, supra note 34, at 2 (noting mistaken, damaging, and abrupt suspension of previous EPA ban on placing drums of liquid hazardous waste in
landfills). Finally, legislators complained that the agency failed to enforce its existing regulations.
See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 99-168, supra note 34, at 26 (The General Accounting Office found that,
despite nearly 150,000 violations of the SDWA requirements, "the enforcement actions in the EPA
offices... included in the review ranged from none to minimal, followed no pattern, and were not as
timely as they could have or should have been."); idL at 17; H.R. REP. No. 98-890, supra note 32, pt.
1, at 26 (EPA's enforcement efforts under CERCLA have lagged); H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra
note 34, pt. 1, at 20, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5579 (EPA's "inadequate effort" to enforce RCRA is "distressing"); id. at 50-51, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 5609 (describing "a truly egregious example" of EPA's failure to enforce RCRA
in timely manner).
36. H.R. REP. No. 99-253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 257-58, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2932; id. at 55, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2837;
ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY" STUDY INST. & ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUTORY DEADLINES IN

ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: NECESSARY BUT NEED IMPROVEMENT iii, 41 (1985) [hereinafter
STATUTORY DEADLINES] (Congress sets deadlines for EPA action because "[ilt doesn't trust [the]
EPA.").
37. See H.R. REp. No. 99-253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 278-79, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2953-54; see also S. REP. No. 98-284, supra note 34, at 23 (statutory
amendments prohibit temporary suspensions of regulations during further revisions or reviews by
EPA); H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5597 (statutory amendment prohibits Administrator from attempting to circumvent Committee's intent to restrict land disposal).

38. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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criteria to guide the agency in implementing its regulatory responsibilities. 39 In short, in recent statutory reauthorizations of environmental

programs, Congress has rejected the traditional discretionary model for
the EPA in favor of the coercive, prescriptive, and ministerial models of

control. 4o
1. The Coercive Model. Under the coercive model, as described
above, Congress mandates agency regulation by removing an agency's
discretion to regulate, but permits the agency to choose the appropriate

method of regulation. 41 Congress has resorted to the coercive model frequently in recent amendments to the EPA's authorizing statutes.4 2 This
model typically forces the agency to regulate by mandating some kind of
agency action-such as listing chemicals as hazardous or issuing regula-

tions applicable to industrial polluters-before a set deadline. The substantive delegation, however, is couched in general terms characteristic

of delegations under the traditional discretionary model.
39. See infra notes 85-88, 97, and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. S6285-86 (daily ed. May 21, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger):
It is unusual for the Senate to include a specific list of pollutants with specific deadlines for
standards in the language of a bill. Choosing contaminants and scheduling the regulatory
process is not normally a legislative function. But the history of the [SDWA] program
more than justifies the use of lists and deadlines by the Congress to assure that standards
are actually established and at the earliest possible date.
But see H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 117, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5633 (Congress should not become regulatory rather than legislative body).
41. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see, eg., H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34,
pt. 1, at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5598 (House Energy and
Commerce Committee "wants to assure that EPA will exercise its authority"); id. at 57, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5616 (1984 amendment to RCRA concerning listing of
hazardous wastes "leaves EPA the discretion as to which toxicants and which concentration levels
should be used as a basis for developing characteristics or listing but mandates that EPA begin doing
so promptly.").
Not all of the recent statutory provisions delegating authority to the EPA fit easily into one of
the four models of control. A "coercive' statute, for example, forces the agency to regulate, but
defines the substance of regulation in only the most general of terms. A "ministerial" statute involves both a deadline to regulate and detailed substantive criteria. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Obviously, there may be statutes that compel agency action by set deadlines and
contain substantive standards that are neither very general nor very specific. Such statutes would
fall between the coercive and ministerial models.
42. The use of statutory deadlines to force action by a sluggish EPA preceded the mid-1980s
reauthorizations, however. Congress took a similar approach, for example, during the 1977 enactment of "mid-course corrections" to the CAA. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-95, sec. 120, § 122(a), 91 Stat. 685, 720 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1982)) (requiring
EPA to decide within one year of the 1977 amendments whether to list four pollutants as hazardous); H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 95-564]
(statutory schedule for EPA's issuance of new source standards of performance intended "to provide
a check on the Administrator's inaction or failure to control emissions adequately"); H.R REP. No.
95-294, supra note 33, at 36, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1114 (expressing dissatisfaction with EPA's failure to impose adequate controls on unregulated pollutants).

Vol. 1988:819]

QUIET REVOLUTION

The 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), 43 the 1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),44 the
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 45 and the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA), 4 6 the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act (CWA), 47
and the 1988 amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act4 8 all include examples of coercive control devices that force
43. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (setting deadline for EPA promulgation of regulations to minimize disposal of containerized liquid hazardous wastes in landfills); id.
§ 6924(g) (setting schedule for reviewing listed hazardous wastes and determining methods of land
disposal protective of human health and the environment); id. § 6924(w) (setting deadline for EPA
to promulgate final standards for issuing permits for underground storage tanks that cannot be entered for inspection); id. § 6923(c) (setting deadline for EPA promulgation of standards applicable to
transporters of fuel produced from hazardous waste); see also H.R. Rap. No. 98-198, supra note 34,
pt. 1, at 57, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5616 (proposed amendment to
RCRA § 3001(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(1) (1982), would leave EPA "discretion as to which toxicants and which concentration levels should be used as a basis for developing characteristics or
listing but mandates that EPA begin doing so promptly").
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9605(b)-(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (deadlines for President to revise
National Contingency Plan and promulgate amendments to hazard ranking system); idL
§ 9604(i)(6)(A) (deadlines for performance of health assessments by Administrator of Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry for each facility on National Priorities List (NPL)); id.
§ 9604(i)(2)-(3) (deadlines for issuing list of at least 100 hazardous substances most commonly found
at facilities on NPL, for adding more hazardous substances to that list, and for preparing toxicological profiles of listed substances); id. § 9602(a) (deadline for EPA regulations establishing reportable
quantities for hazardous substances); id. § 9616(b)-(e) (schedules for evaluating facilities listed in
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), for commencing remedial investigations and feasibility studies for facilities on NPL, and for
commencing remedial actions at such facilities); 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (deadline for Secretary of Labor to issue standards for health and safety protection of employees engaged
in hazardous waste operations). The EPA issued a five-page timeline listing EPA tasks subject to
deadlines in the five years following the enactment of the 1986 amendments to CERCLA. See Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1197 (Nov. 14, 1986).
45. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(l) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (setting schedule for EPA promulgation of national primary drinking water regulations for specific contaminants); id. § 300gl(b)(7)(C)(i) (setting deadline for EPA promulgation of "criteria under which filtration ... is required as a treatment technique for public water systems supplied by surface water sources"); id.
§ 300h-5(a) (setting deadline for EPA modification of ground water monitoring regulations for Class
I injection wells).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 2643(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (deadlines for EPA promulgation of regulations
for removal of asbestos from schools).
47. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 301(f), 101 Stat. 7, 30 (1987) (setting deadlines for EPA
issuance of regulations establishing effluent limitations for certain categories of point sources discharging toxic pollutants); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(m) (West Supp. 1988) (schedule for EPA publication
of plan for annual review and revision of effluent guidelines); id § 1342(p)(4) (deadlines for EPA
issuance of regulations setting forth permit application requirements for storm water discharges); id.
§ 1342(p)(6) (deadline for EPA issuance of regulations establishing program to regulate designated
sources of storm water discharges); id § 1345(d)(2)(A)(i) (deadline for EPA identification of toxic
pollutants whose presence in sewage sludge may adversely affect public health or the environment).
48. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No.
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the EPA to make decisions within a specified time. 49 Proposed changes
in the Clear Air Act (CAA) 50 would also have imposed deadlines for
EPA regulatory action.
Congress intends coercive statutes to accelerate the pace of regulation 5 by making it easier for an agency to issue regulations and to facilitate legislative oversight. Deadlines can assist agency decisionmaking by
mitigating outside pressures to avoid reaching a decision 52 and giving the

agency a reason to end its analysis and make a difficult, but necessary
decision.5 3 The agency may also feel more comfortable in delaying an
100-532, sec. 102(a), § 3A, 102 Stat. 2654, - - - (setting deadlines for re-registration of pesticides'
active ingredients).
49. An alternative way to coerce agency action is to authorize private persons to petition for the
initiation ofagency action, such as rulemaking proceedings. Statutes that authorize private petitions
typically provide for judicial review of agency decisions denying petitions. Ifa reviewing court overturns an agency's denial, the result may be a court-imposed deadline for agency action. Recent
environmental statutes contain examples of this kind of coercive device. See, eg., 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 131 l(g)(4) (West Supp. 1988) (authorizing EPA, upon petition of any person, to add any pollutant
to the list of nontoxic, non-conventional pollutants for which modified effluent limitations are appropriate); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11,023(e) (Supp. IV
1986) (any person may petition EPA to add or delete chemical from list of toxic chemicals subject to
reporting requirements; upon receiving such petition, EPA must, within specified time, either initiate
rulemaking or publish explanation why petition denied).
50. See, eg., H.R. 967, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a), introduced, 131 CONG. REC. H327 (daily
ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (deadlines for EPA classification of substances to determine whether they are
hazardous air pollutants and for issuance of national emission standards for categories of stationary
sources emitting such pollutants); id. § 201 (deadline for EPA publication of list of motor vehicle
hazardous air pollutants and issuance of emission standards for such pollutants).
51. See, eg., S. REP. No. 99-56, supra note 34, at 2, 5, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 1567, 1570-71 (primary objective of Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works is to expedite EPA's issuance of national primary drinking water regulations under
SDWA); H.R. REP. No. 98-890, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 28 ("The timetables set forth in this legislation will serve as insurance against a repetition of the mismanagement and lax enforcement that
plagued the program [previously]" ); idL at 51; 132 CONG. REc. 86292 (daily ed. May 21, 1986)
(statement of Sen. Stafford) (statutory deadlines will require EPA to accelerate pace of issuing standards for drinking water contaminants); 131 CONG. REc. H11,078 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Roe) (statutory deadlines "are designed to assure that EPA actions are taken in a
timely and responsive manner"); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 23, 45,
reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5582, 5604 (deadlines needed to accelerate
EPA's issuance of permits for hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities); id. at 42,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5601 (legislative objective in setting statutory schedule is "to accelerate the Agency's rulemaking to close a major gap in the present regulations" governing burning of hazardous waste).
52. See STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at ii. Pressures from OMB to cut back on
resources, for example, can be countered better if deadlines have identified a problem as a legislative
priority. Id. at 27. For example, Congress has used deadlines to prevent OMB from holding up the
issuance of EPA regulations on the grounds that they are not cost-justified. See 132 CONG. REC.
86286 (daily ed. May 21, 1986) (statement of Sen. Durenberger); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(1)
(Supp. IV 1986) (1986 amendments to SDWA, setting deadlines for EPA's issuance of national primary drinking water regulations).
53. Without a deadline, agencies tend to delay difficult decisions in the hope that additional
evidence will be forthcoming or the necessity for a decision will disappear. See STATUTORY DEAD-
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attempted resolution of other problems than it would absent action-forcing deadlines.5 4 Deadlines improve legislative oversight because Congress can easily determine whether a statutory deadline has been met."

Moreover, Congress is more likely to demand compliance with such
deadlines than with open-ended statutory obligations, because a deadline
represents a public commitment to achieve a certain end.5 6 The coercive
model also permits Congress to narrow an agency's discretion even when
Congress lacks the expertise to prescribe substantive standards for regulation 57 or is unable to agree on detailed legislation.
Statutory deadlines also speed regulation because statutory beneficiaries can enforce deadlines in the courts. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes courts to "compel agency action . . .
LINES, supra note 36, at 30-31; McGarity & Shapiro, OSHA Rulemaking Procedures, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 79, 187 (1987) (agencies

tend to delay decisions by citing need for more information).
54. Statutory deadlines, by sending signals to the agency that certain problems have a higher
legislative priority than others, may make it easier for the agency to isolate those problems for immediate attention. See, eg., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., THE FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 111 (5th ed. 1986) ("Many of EPA's difficulties over the years can be traced to the fact
that Congress loaded the agency with far more statutory responsibilities within a brief period of time
than perhaps any agency could effectively perform." (quoting Russell Train, former EPA Administrator)); Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 740, 791-93 (1983) (describing "administrative overload" that made EPA unable to translate
CAA's goals into concrete results). Moreover, a recent study of statutory deadlines in federal pollution control legislation concluded that deadlines attract the attention of agency management, enhance prospects for agency funding of the matter addressed by the deadline, and may even prompt
development of new and effective regulatory approaches. See STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note
36, at 27, 30.
55. See Ogden, Reducing Administrative Delay: Timeliness Standards, Judicial Review of
Agency Procedures,Procedural Reform, and Legislative Oversight, 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 71, 85
(1979) (legislative imposition of standards for timeliness indicates legislature's commitment to timely
agency decisionmaking).. A statutory deadline also provides "a clear, articulable substantive standard easily used by oversight committees at agency and budget review time." Id. But cf STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at 31 ("Congressional committees, particularly in the Senate,
reportedly lack the staff to conduct thorough, regular oversight"). If the agency in question has
missed its deadline, legislators in oversight or appropriations hearings can require the agency to
explain what has impeded its progress. If the legislators find the agency's explanation convincing,
they can shift legislative priorities or increase the agency's budget to facilitate resolution of the
problem.
56. See Ogden, supra note 55, at 85.
57. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 65, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5624 (1984 RCRA amendment requiring EPA to determine whether
certain used oils should be listed as hazardous wastes "mandat[es] an outside date for final EPA
action, but leav[es] the Agency with the discretion to make the necessary technical decisions"); H.R.
REP. No. 95-294, supra note 33, at 41, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
1119 (Although the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce felt that "some impetus
for EPA to act to regulate... unregulated pollutants was needed," the Committee did "not intend to
specify the degree of emission reduction which should be required .... [Tihe Administrator should
apply the appropriate means and extent of regulation under the existing statutory criteria ....
).
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unreasonably delayed."'5 8 A review of the cases interpreting this APA

requirement indicates that statutory deadlines increase the likelihood
that a court will find an agency's delay unreasonable and will force the
agency to remedy that delay.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has applied a three-factor 5 9 "rule of reason" 6 to determine when to mandate
agency action. 61 First, a court must consider the context of the statutory
scheme authorizing the agency to act. 62 If the statute includes a deadline
for agency action, the agency has no regulatory discretion at all; it must

act according to the legislative timetable. 63 Judicial relief to redress action "unreasonably delayed" is therefore more likely in a case involving a
statutory deadline. Second, a court must examine the consequences of
the agency's delay. Delays that might be deemed "reasonable" in the
context of economic regulation are less likely to be tolerated "when
human lives are at stake." 64 Third, a court must consider the agency's
58. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982); cf id § 555(b) (requiring agencies to "proceed to conclude a
matter presented to" them "within a reasonable time"). Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1982) (federal courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions"), the federal courts may issue a writ of mandamus compelling an agency to take any action
that has been "unreasonably delayed." See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 795-96 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
59. See Telecommunications Research, 750 F.2d at 80 (describing "hexagonal contours" of
standard for unreasonable delay); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Commissioner of FDA,
740 F.2d 21, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (listing relevant considerations).
60. See TelecommunicationsResearch, 750 F.2d at 80; see also Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers
Int'l Union v. Zeeger, 768 F.2d 1480, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
61. These efforts have focused on distinguishing good faith justifications that have some
"ground[ing] in the purposes of the" statute in question from "the foot-dragging efforts of a delinquent agency." NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d
879, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens (El Congreso) v. Marshall,
626 F.2d 882, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 171 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785, 787 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
62. Cutler, 818 F.2d at 897; Health Research Group, 740 F.2d at 35. In particular, the court
must ascertain the degree of discretion that Congress has delegated to the agency. Cutler, 818 F.2d
at 897; see also Zegeer, 768 F.2d at 1487 (congressional indications of pace at which agency should
proceed are relevant).
63. See, eg., Train, 510 F.2d at 704; Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp.
566, 569 (D.D.C. 1986) (statutory deadline creates nondiscretionary duty to act); New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 ($.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 794
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (express statutory deadline imposes duty of timeliness); Telecommunications Research, 750 F.2d at 80 (if Congress provides timetable, statute itself may supply content for "rule of
reason"); cf In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d 1346, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (agency's failure to
comply with statutory deadline is "not in accordance with law," violating 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982)).
But see infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text (courts retain equitable discretion to refrain from
ordering agencies to comply with statutory deadlines).
64. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
overruled, Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see
Cutler, 818 F.2d at 898; Telecommunications Research, 750 F.2d at 80; Health Research Group, 740
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justification for delay. 65 Courts have sometimes accepted an agency's
claim that the technical complexity of the issue involved justified its decision to delay action in order to accumulate and analyze more information.6 6 In addition, courts have displayed some sympathy for claims that
an order requiring an agency to expedite its decisionmaking process

could disrupt agency priorities by requiring a diversion of scarce re68
sources 67 from other, more important projects.
When agencies have ignored statutory deadlines, though, courts are
less likely to accept these justifications. Equitable discretion allows
F.2d at 32; cf Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("With lives hanging in the balance, six years [of delay] is a very long time.").
65. Health Research Group, 740 F.2d at 35.
66. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d at 798 (refusing to expedite EPA's issuance of
CAA regulations involving "complex scientific, technological, and policy questions"); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (denying unions'
petition for mandamus to compel OSHA to undertake rulemaking to protect workers from benzene
on expedited basis, because complex scientific and technical issues involved made judicial imposition
of "an overly hasty timetable" contrary to public interest); Zeeger, 768 F.2d at 1487-88 (refusing to
order Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) to expedite rulemaking to protect underground miners from radon gas, in light of complex scientific and technical issues involved). In these
circumstances, the courts have pointed out, insistence upon expedited agency action can be counterproductive: a court might force an agency to issue a decision without enough evidentiary support to
withstand an attack on the merits. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d at 798 (EPA must be given
sufficient time to analyze questions and reach "considered results.., that will not be arbitrary and
capricious or an abuse of discretion"); United Steelworkers, 783 F.2d at 1120 (refusing to expedite
agency decision because agency's rule and its underlying rationale "must be constructed carefully
and thoroughly if the agency's action is to pass judicial scrutiny this time around"); Train, 510 F.2d
at 712 (delay that permits EPA to understand relative merits of available control technologies might
speed abatement of pollution by obviating need for time-consuming corrective measures).
67. The courts have recognized that budgetary and manpower constraints can support a conclusion that an agency's delay is "reasonable." See, eg., Cutler, 818 F.2d at 898; Health Research
Group, 740 F.2d at 34; Train, 510 F.2d at 712. The courts have sometimes imposed timetables for
agency action notwithstanding such contentions by the agency, however, even in the absence of
statutory deadlines. See, eg., Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 205-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
68. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d at 791, 797-98 (refusing to order expedited EPA
rulemaking, since EPA's broad statutory framework "will almost necessarily place competing demands upon the agency's time and resources," and EPA should be afforded discretion in reconciling
competing priorities); Brock 823 F.2d at 629 (noting that OSHA "must juggle competing rulemaking demands on its limited scientific and legal staf' and that courts should override agency priorities
and timetables "only in the most egregious of cases"); TelecommunicationsResearch, 750 F.2d at 80
(court should consider how expediting delayed activities affects activities with higher or competing
priority); Health Research Group, 740 F.2d at 34 (court must consider "the constraints on the
agency in allocating its investigatory and enforcement resources"); National Congress of Hispanic
Am. Citizens (El Congreso) v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (agency has better
perspective on competing demands; thus, court should defer to agency's prioritization and allocation
of resources); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d at 1158 (expressing hesitation to require expedited action if it would disrupt matters of higher priority, but finding no such
situation in case). But cf. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(setting deadlines for long-delayed agency rate decisions "despite the possible displacement of agency
resources or the possible effect on other proceedings").
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courts to refrain from ordering agencies to comply with statutory deadlines when compliance is impossible, 69 but courts impose a heavy burden
of justifying impossibility claims,7 0 and regularly require agencies to
71
comply with statutory deadlines despite such claims.

Although courts recognize the need for judicially enforceable dead-

lines as a remedy for unreasonable delay, 72 they frequently seem uncomfortable enforcing such deadlines. Some courts believe that they must
solicit a revised timetable from the agency and must accept it if the
agency proceeds in good faith. 73 While other courts deny any obligation
to solicit the agency's views in drafting a timetable, 74 most nevertheless

do so. 75 And judicial ire is greatest when an agency misses its own timetable.76 Thus, coercive statutes authorizing agencies to set initial dead69. See, e.g., Train, 510 F.2d at 712-13; Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 171 (N.D.
Cal. 1987); New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Issuance of a
contempt citation, for example, would be inappropriate in these circumstances. Train, 510 F.2d at
713; see also Brock 823 F.2d at 628 (contempt citation "would be a draconian and disproportionate
remedy" when agency has made "good faith" effort to comply); cf Illinois v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1597, 1599 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that "[tihere is little a court of equity can do" to
enforce statutory deadlines against agencies that plead impossibility, and suggesting that plaintiffs
turn to the political forum to accomplish their goals), affid sub nom. Citizens for a Better Env't v.
Costle, 617 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
70. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. at 171-72; New York v. Ruckelshaus, 21 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1721, 1723 (D.D.C. 1984); New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. at 1064 (citing
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
71. See Train, 510 F.2d at 714; Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. at 175; New York v.
Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. at 1065; Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785, 788-89 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
For other cases requiring compliance with statutory deadlines, see Environmental Defense Fund v.
Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that OMB could not invoke its authority to delay
issuance of EPA regulations beyond deadline established in 1984 amendments to RCRA); Illinois v.
Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340 (D.D.C. 1981), affid, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (denying EPA's
request for extension to comply with deadlines set in RCRA). The courts may be more receptive to
the argument in deadline cases that a failure to force the agency's hand could subvert the purposes of
the regulatory scheme. See, eg., In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d 1346, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(NHTSA's persistent failure to meet statutory deadline "eviserates the very purpose of the regulation"); Environmental Defense Fund, 627 F. Supp. at 572 (injunctive relief forcing compliance with
deadlines "is necessary to ensure compliance with the clearly expressed will of Congress"); Sierra
Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. at 789 ("To accept EPA's proposal for further, indefinite, and virtually open-ended extension of the time for compliance. .. would be to, in effect, repeal the Congressional mandate.").
72. See Train, 510 F.2d at 705 (judicially enforceable deadlines "vindicate the public interest").
73. E.g., EnvironmentalDefense Fund, 627 F. Supp. at 569-70; Illinois v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 1597.
74. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. at 171 & n.6 (when agency misses statutory
deadline, judicial deference to agency inappropriate).
75. See, e.g., Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1987); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1980); National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens (El Congreso) v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 207 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Train, 510 F.2d at 705.
76. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
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lines are more likely to be strictly enforced than those imposing statutory
deadlines on the agency.
That the courts prefer agencies to set their own timetables for accelerated action illustrates one disadvantage of statutory deadlines-they
place courts in the awkward position of second-guessing how an agency
should use its resources. Moreover, since deadlines do not simplify the
agency's substantive task,77 they can create unrealistic time pressures or
more deadlines than an agency can realistically meet. 78 In such circumstances, the agency is likely to take regulatory action that is hasty, without adequate evidentiary support, and thus unable to withstand judicial
review, 79 or to divert its resources to litigation in an effort to justify its
overruled, Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986); AARP
v. EEOC, 655 F. Supp. 228, 238-41 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 823 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (denying
order to compel action where agency appeared to be proceeding toward completion in reasonable
time); cf In re American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 837 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to issue
writ of mandamus where agency apparently attempted to comply with its own goals for accelerated
action); In re American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 790 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).
77. In a coercive statute, the legislature forces the agency to act, but leaves the question of how
to regulate in the agency's hands. Thus, a deadline on action pursuant to a vague substantive mandate may not significantly narrow the most difficult and time-consuming choices required of the
agency--choices among competing values, policies, or goals. See Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1278-80 (1985) (arguing that
Congress should not delegate regulation to agencies, but rather could use agency as "expert" when
drafting regulations); Schoenbrod, supra note 54, at 753-54 ("goals statutes" such as the CAA "leave
key value choices to low visibility decisionmakers fearful of making controversial choices").
78. One author has described the deadlines that require the EPA to regulate hazardous air
pollutants as "ludicrous." Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne
Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 123. A recent study
indicates that the EPA has met few of its deadlines. See STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at
12. According to deadline critics, Congress is insensitive to agencies' resource constraints and priority conflicts, Abbott, The Case Against FederalStatutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit
Appraisal, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 182 (1987), is unfamiliar with the details of the regulatory

process,

SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOLUME
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DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS, S. Doc. No. 72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1977) [hereinafter S. Doc. No. 95-72], or fails to appreciate that proceedings with difficult degrees of complexity
require different deadlines, Tomlinson, Report on the Experience of Various Agencies with Statutory
Time Limits Applicable to Licensing or ClearanceFunctions and to Rulemaking, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 119, 122 (1978).
79. See H.R. RE'. No. 99-253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 56, 71, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2838, 2853; see also STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at 35 (state
official says that "EPA has sacrificed a lot of quality to meet deadlines. Deadlines have served to
degrade performance."); 6 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2051-52 (1986) (criticisms by OMB officials). Strict
time limits make it more difficult for the agency to obtain useful input from the regulated community, interested members of the public, and other government agencies such as the OMB. Abbott,
supra note 78, at 196-97. A recent study of deadlines imposed on the EPA, however, indicates that
attempts to meet congressional deadlines have only rarely compromised the quality of EPA actions.
See STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at 34, 37 (EPA frequently ignores deadlines or seeks
extensions if it needs more time to act); id. at 35 ("Our findings clearly negate the common argument
that the EPA sacrifices quality of workmanship to meet deadlines.").

836

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:819

failure to meet the deadlines. 80 The agency's failure to meet its deadlines
may also increase public pressure for more deadlines that the agency cannot meet. 8' Even if the agency manages to comply with some deadlines,

doing so may force it to misallocate its resources by shifting them from
82
tasks it deems important to others it considers subsidiary.
Perhaps the most important problem with using coercive delegations to reduce agency discretion is that even if an agency acts on time, a

coercive statute requires only that the agency act, not that it act in a
particular way.83 Thus, the coercive model's success in preventing an
agency from subverting a congressional mandate may depend on a

court's willingness to scrutinize the substance of the agency's decision.
However, as discussed below, the courts have become increasingly reluc-

tant to second-guess agencies' statutory interpretation and implementation. 84 In response to these problems, Congress might prefer to constrain
agency discretion by using the two models characterized by more specific
substantive guidance.

2. The Prescriptive and Ministerial Models.

The prescriptive

model of controlling agency discretion reverses the two components of
80. See H.R. REp. No. 99-253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 56, 71, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2838, 2853; Graham, supra note 78, at 124, 126.
81. When the agency misses these deadlines, congressional and public disrespect and distrust of
the agency increases, causing a clamor for even more stringent deadlines, which also cannot be met.
STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at 41, 43-44, 50. Former EPA Administrator William
Ruckelshaus, an opponent of statutory deadlines, charges that unrealistically short deadlines "undermine[ J confidence in EPA managers, cause[ ] the public to measure them against unrealistic
goals, and to think we've failed and obscure the successes we've made. Deadlines reinforce the sense
that we (EPA) are not getting anywhere, to the detriment of public sense of confidence in government." Id. at 48; see also H.R. REP. No. 99-253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 311, reprintedin 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2985 (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("[E]xcessively rigid clean up
schedules [under CERCLA] are self-defeating and actually encourage the kind of misfeasance and
malfeasance that has crippled the Superfund program to date.").
82. See 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1975-76 (1986) (EPA Administrator Lee Thomas states that
meeting deadlines in 1984 RCRA amendments may prevent EPA from carrying out such essential
work as ensuring that unpermitted hazardous waste disposal facilities are safely closed down); see
also STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at 44 (deadlines limit EPA's ability to manage its own
priorities); Graham, supra note 78, at 124-27 (EPA's relatively fruitless attempt to comply with
statutory deadlines for regulating hazardous air pollutants diverted effort from development of emission standards for new sources). One study concluded that statutory deadlines have "undermined
OSHA's efforts to determine its own priorities by forcing it to concentrate its resources on rulemaking proceedings that are subject to statutory deadlines." Tomlinson, supra note 78, at 201. The
counterargument, of course, is that although resources have been reallocated, they have not been
misallocated, since the statutory deadlines reflect Congress's policy choice that issues governed by
deadlines are more important.
83. As one court noted, once a court orders compliance with a deadline, "the issue of any
shortfall in performance by the agency will become a matter for discussion within the ... legislature." NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
84. See infra notes 175-203 and accompanying text.
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the coercive model: an agency retains its regulatory discretion, but, if it

chooses to regulate, it must do so in accordance with relatively detailed
substantive criteria.85 Although Congress has on occasion resorted to
the prescriptive model, 86 it has more frequently used the ministerial
model.
Under the ministerial model, Congress removes or limits the
agency's discretion over both whether and how to regulate. The typical
ministerial statute couples a deadline with a detailed substantive standard defining the appropriate manner of regulation. In their most extreme form, ministerial statutes operate as inalterable rules of law; no
agency has the authority to modify them or affect their implementa-

tion.87 Congress has applied the ministerial model frequently in recent
amendments to or proposals to amend many of the environmental
statutes.88
85. An example of the prescriptive model is section 112 of the CAA, which authorizes the EPA
to control emissions from hazardous air pollutants. The EPA has discretion to decide whether a
pollutant is sufficiently hazardous to warrant emissions limitations, but once it makes such a decision, the factors it may consider in setting a limitation on allowable emissions are limited by statute.
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
86. The 1984 amendments to the RCRA contain some examples of the prescriptive model. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6921(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) (obligating EPA to decide "fifteen months after November 8, 1984" whether to list 17 chemical substances or classes of substances as hazardous wastes); id.
§ 6935(b) (requiring EPA to decide "twelve months after November 8, 1984" whether to list automobile and truck crankcase oil as hazardous waste under RCRA); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-294,
supra note 33, at 36, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 1114 (requiring EPA
to regulate four cancer causing pollutants unless new evidence found that pollutants are safe for
humans at forseeable levels of exposure). Once the EPA lists a substance as hazardous, under the
statute the EPA must require leak detection and other measures in handling that substance. Eg., 42
U.S.C. § 6924(o)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
87. The 1984 RCRA amendments, for example, simply prohibit the placement of bulk or noncontainerized liquid hazardous wastes or free liquids contained in any hazardous waste in any landfill. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); cf id. § 6924(c)(2) (requiring EPA to issue regulations
"prohibit[ing] the disposal in landfills of liquids that have been absorbed in materials that biodegrade
or that release liquids when compressed during routine landfill operations"). In response to the
environmental disaster at Times Beach, Missouri, see S. REP.No. 98-284, supra note 34, at 23, the
amendments also bar the use of waste or used oil contaminated by dioxin or another listed hazardous
waste for dust suppression or road treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o (Supp. IV 1986). These prohibitions take effect without the need for agency implementation. However, Congress must still rely on
the agency to enforce such rules.
88. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 30 0 g-6 (Supp. IV 1986) (banning use of lead in repairs to public water
systems); id. § 6921(d)(8) (specifying standards for small-quantity generators of hazardous waste
unless EPA adopts alternative standards); id. § 6924(b) (banning placement of certain hazardous
wastes in salt dome formations, salt bed foundations, underground mines, and caves until EPA
determines that such placement can be conducted in manner protective of health and the environment and adopts protective standards); supra note 82; infra notes 96-97; see also H.R. REP. No.
1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1984) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 98-1133] (amended SDWA provision authorizing regulation of used oil contaminated with hazardous waste "sets new deadlines for
promulgation of standards and provides more detailed direction for the standards than is contained
in the current" statute).
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By reducing an agency's discretion concerning what type of regulation to adopt, 89 a prescriptive statute helps the agency to craft a regula-

tory program consistent with legislative intent 90 and, because of the
specificity of the agency's substantive mandate, assists judicial review of
the agency's adherence to that mandate. 91 The ministerial approach has

a different advantage. When legislators are concerned about agencies
that seem reluctant to regulate at all, mandating deadlines addresses the
problem. In fact, the predominance of the ministerial model over the
prescriptive seems to indicate that whenever Congress has felt competent
and has mustered the collective will to enact prescriptive standards, it
has also thought it necessary to reduce the risk that agencies would circumvent the legislature's specific directives by choosing not to regulate at
all. 92
89. Congress has used the prescriptive model to prevent the EPA from providing unintended
regulatory exemptions, see, eg., S. REP. No. 98-284, supra note 34, at 32-33 (amended RCRA will
"prescribe in greater detail the responsibilities of the Agency with respect to listing and identifying
hazardous wastes and granting exemptions from regulations"); id. at 64 (ending certain precisely
described facilities' exemptions from groundwater monitoring requirements); H.R. REP. No. 98-198,
supra note 34, pt. 1,at 63, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5622 (same),
from improperly taking cost/benefit or risk/benefit considerations into account, see, e.g., id. at 6263, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5621-22, and from weakening environmental protection measures despite contrary legislative intent, see, eg., H.R. REP. No. 99-253, supra
note 32, pt. I, at 272, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2947 (specific standards necessary to prevent EPA from undermining Superfund program through site-by-site decisions); S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) [hereinafter S.REP. No. 99-50] (proposed
Clean Water Act amendments responded to EPA efforts "to significantly weaken water quality standards regulations").
90. Prescriptive delegations provide more guidance to the agency, see, e.g., H.R. REP.No. 99253, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 273, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2948
(CERCLA should require EPA to choose relatively well-defined permanent remedies at Superfund
sites rather than relying upon "open-ended and discretionary exhortation" "to choose permanent
treatment only 'to the maximum extent practicable' "), promote more consistent administration of
statutory programs, see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-890, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 45 (criticizing EPA's
inability to develop uniform, consistent standards to determine appropriate extent of cleanup of
Superfund sites), and prevent agencies from acting on the basis of factors considered irrelevant or
consciously rejected by Congress, but pressed upon the agency by the regulated community or by
those sympathetic to it, see Jaffe, The Illusion of Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183,
1188-89 (1973) (the more elaborately defined the legislative delegation, the less likely that agency
decisions will be dictated by political pressures).
91. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 64, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG, & ADMIN. NEWS at 5623 (Because the EPA has failed to comply with previous statutory
deadlines to issue regulations covering management of used oil, "a further prod to the Agency is
needed. The Committee also believes it is necessary to provide EPA with more detailed direction[s]
than are contained in the (current statute] as to how to proceed with its regulatory task."); H.R. 967,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, introduced, 131 CONG. REC. H327 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (proposal to
amend CAA provisions that authorize regulation of hazardous air pollutants is intended to "provide
a timetable for decisions by the Administrator whether to regulate substances known to be emitted
into the atmosphere and known or suspected to be hazardous air pollutants [and] provide for the
protection of the public health should the Administrator fail to abide by the timetable for decision").
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The ministerial model, however, is by no means problem-free. The
establishment of a statutory deadline does not ensure that the agency will
actually meet it. Judicial discomfort with the deadlines in coercive statutes may hamper the enforcement of ministerial statutes as well.93 In
addition, because a ministerial statute contains detailed legislative standards, to pass such a statute, Congress must overcome the same institutional and political hurdles that have traditionally induced it to rely on
94
the discretionary model.
To minimize these difficulties, recent environmental statutes use two
innovative techniques. First, in a series of provisions sometimes called
statutory "hammers, ' 95 Congress has given the EPA a certain period of
time to regulate; if at the end of the specified time the agency has failed to
act, the "hammer" falls, and the regulatory result set forth in the statute
automatically goes into effect.9 6 Second, in other ministerial statutes,
Congress has established specific substantive criteria that go into effect
unless and until the agency issues regulations changing the legislatively
97
specified standard.
93. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. The establishment of a multitude of deadlines poses these problems under ministerial and coercive legislation as well. Multiple deadlines are
likely to reduce the clarity of the signals Congress is seeking to send to the agency and to impose
unachievable tasks on the agency. Ineffective statutory implementation, increased agency frustration, and renewed legislative distrust of the agency are the probable results. See supra notes 78-83
and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
95. See Ottinger, Strengthening of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1984: The
Original Loopholes, the Amendments, and the Political Factors Behind Their Passage, 3 PACE
ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 22 & n.146 (1985). The "hammer" label is appropriate: Congress adopts these
provisions to beat the agency into submission to the legislative will.
96. For example, the 1984 RCRA amendments list in minute detail a series of substances considered hazardous wastes, including liquids containing arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury,
nickel, selenium, or thallium at or above certain concentrations, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(2) (Supp. IV
1986), as well as specified dioxin-containing materials, id. § 6924(e)(2). The EPA has up to 32
months to determine that prohibiting the land disposal of these wastes is not necessary to protect
human health and the environment, but if the agency fails to make that determination on time, the
prohibition goes into effect automatically. Id. § 6924(d)(1); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra
note 34, pt. 1, at 36 (if EPA fails to make determination on the wastes listed by specified time, waste
is prohibited from all methods of land disposal until determination is made); 131 CONG. REC.
HI 1,232 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1985) (statement of Rep. Florio) (if EPA fails to comply with proposed
CERCLA amendment that gives it 18 months to publish list of acute toxic chemicals, it will have to
"live with" congressionally prescribed list); 42 U.S.C. § 6924(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1986) (banning disposal of certain hazardous wastes by deep well injection if EPA fails to make determination concerning
need for such a ban). Congress has enacted similar hammer provisions under the TSCA as well. See
15 U.S.C. § 2644 (Supp. IV 1986) (detailed specification of appropriate manner of removing asbestos
from schools if EPA fails to issue regulations in a timely manner).
97. The 1984 RCRA amendments, for example, require the EPA to issue regulations to force
the owners of new landfills or surface impoundments to install two liners. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(1)(A)
(Supp. IV 1986). Until the effective date of those regulations, the requirement for a lower liner is
deemed satisfied by the construction of "at least a 3-foot thick layer of recompacted clay or other
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These innovations address some of the key deficiencies in the coer-

cive and prescriptive models of legislation. The statutes have an automatic, built-in response to the agency regulatory discretion that weakens
the coercive model as a device for controlling agency discretion. 98 In
addition, by giving agencies the opportunity to act before legislative solutions become law, these statutory innovations allow agencies to override
erroneous congressional judgments or misplaced legislative emphasis. 99

Finally, legislators may find it easier to make decisions concerning technical matters if they know that an agency has the authority to bail Congress out of any mistaken judgments. 100

natural material with a permeability of no more than 1 X 10' centimeter per second." Id
§ 6924(o)(5)(B). Similarly, Congress has in at least one instance ordered the EPA to regulate a
specific list of substances, while permitting the agency to substitute a limited number of substances
that it considers more worthy of regulation. See id § 300g-l(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). In still another
variation, ministerial statutes give the regulated community the burden of proving that a regulation
is unnecessary or inappropriate instead of giving the agency the burden of proving the need for
regulation. See, eg., id. § 6924(c)(3) (placement of any liquid in landfills licensed for hazardous
waste disposal prohibited unless landfill owner or operator demonstrates to EPA that alternative
disposal methods are unsatisfactory and that landfill disposal will not present risk of groundwater
contamination).
98. If an agency fails to comply with statutory deadlines, the substantive rule favored by Congress takes effect without the need for further action by either Congress or the agency. Moreover, a
hammer provision may actually facilitate the issuance of agency rules in two ways. First, an agency
subject to a hammer provision is aware that if it fails to meet a statutory deadline, Congress will
make the decision. The agency thus has an incentive to meet the deadline in order to avoid losing
regulatory control. In at least one instance, Congress has imposed a hammer that has transferred
EPA's regulatory authority to another agency as a penalty for missing a deadline. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2022(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988) (transferring control of mill tailings at uranium and thorium mines
from EPA to NRC); see also STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at 61 (discussing various
sanctions used in hammers). A coercive statute would not give the agency the same incentive to act.
See, e.g., Central States Enters. v. ICC, 780 F.2d 664, 672 n.8 (7th Cir. 1985) (agency's failure to
meet statutory deadline does not necessarily strip it of jurisdiction if statute fails to specify sanction
for missing deadlines). Second, the regulated commmunity also has an incentive to cooperate with
an agency operating subject to a hammer-an incentive absent in many rulemaking contexts. Typically, those subject to proposed new regulations seek to delay agency action, since delay preserves
the status quo of no regulation. But the threat posed by a draconian legislative hammer may prompt
industry to work with the agency to enact a rule that industry considers easier to live with. See
STATUTORY DEADLINES, supra note 36, at 60-61.
99. See, eg., 131 CONG. REC. H 11,231 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1985) (statement of Rep. Carper)
(proposed CERCLA amendment gives EPA 18 months to enact list of acutely toxic materials before
congressional list automatically takes effect; EPA is involved in "the 'king of the mountain' scenario,
almost, revisited").
100. Further, legislators may more willingly make difficult political choices if they can later shift
responsibility for correcting (or failing to correct) ill-informed decisions to the agency. Cf.Graham,
supra note 78, at 142 n.280 (legislators who oppose environmental regulation may vote in favor of
regulatory legislation that they know is unworkable in order to reap benefit of supporting a popular
objective while being able to blame agency for failing to achieve it).
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The Future of Legislative Control of Delegated Powers.

Congress has only recently begun to resort to the alternative models
of controlling delegated agency discretion, and it is not yet clear whether
the movement away from the discretionary model in the environmental
area will be a short-lived phenomenon or part of a broader trend in administrative law. Congress has the ability to use the alternative models
more extensively in other substantive areas, but may find it more difficult
to muster the political will to employ the alternative models in non-environmental contexts. Moreover, these models will not be an appropriate

means of controlling agency discretion in all situations. They are subject
to abuse if not applied carefully. Even if used appropriately, they will
not, and should not, eliminate agency discretion.
The recent wave of highly detailed environmental statutes demonstrates Congress's ability to develop the necessary information and expertise to pass narrow and specific legislation. One reason why Congress
has been able to pass such specific statutes is that important policy deci-

sions often do not involve issues of fact and thus require no scientific
expertise for their resolution. 10 ' Congress may be as well equipped to

make those kinds of judgments as any agency. Moreover, even when a
regulatory decision involves a factual issue, Congress has substantial resources, including the expertise of its members and staff,' 02 its hearing
process, 0 3 the advice of the agency itself,'0 4 and of other outside organi101. If, for example, there is no level below which adverse effects will not occur in people exposed to a given toxic substance, then promulgating anything other than a no-discharge standard for
that substance necessarily requires a policy determination as to what is an "acceptable" level of
exposure to the substance. See McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogensin EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J.
729, 733-36 (1979); Schoenbrod, supra note 54, at 807-08; Stenzel, Toxic Substance Regulation: A
Compelling Situationfor Revival of the Delegation Doctrine, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1986).
102. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 21, at 23. See generally Hill, The Third
House of Congress Versus the Fourth Branch of Government: The Impact of CongressionalCommittee Staff on Agency Regulatory Decisionmaking, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 247 (1986) (discussing
growth and development of informal committee staff bureaucracy).
103. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 99-168, supra note 34, at 17 (hearings on SDWA amendments
provided House Committee on Energy and Commerce with "a tremendous amount of valuable information"); H.R. REP. No. 95-294, supra note 33, at 38, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 1116.
104. See, eg., S. REP. No. 98-284, supra note 34, at 18 (provision in 1984 RCRA amendments
requiring EPA to decide whether or not to ban land disposal of specified hazardous wastes should be
based on "information from the years of work EPA and others have devoted to developing a degree
of hazard system"); id. at 22 (statutory meaning of liquid wastes banned from landfill disposal based
on definitions already in EPA's regulations); id. at 23 (landfill disposal of hazardous waste by lab
pack must be in accordance with EPA specifications issued in 1981); H.R. RaP. No. 95-294, supra
note 33, at 174-77, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1253-56 (House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce's decision to require program for preventing significant
deterioration of clean air based on 30 EPA studies of need for such a program). See generally
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zations, 10 5 to obtain and evaluate the technical information necessary to
make that decision. Since the same resources are available in non-environmental fields, 10 6 Congress should be able to legislate more specifically
in those areas as well.
In non-environmental regulatory fields, however, Congress may not
be as capable of overcoming the political obstacles to detailed legislation.
Although the same political motivations that led Congress to change the

nature of its environmental regulation apply to other fields, 10 7 three additional factors that explain the recent wave of more detailed legislation are
somewhat unique to the environmental context. First, congressional dissatisfaction with agency performance in the environmental area has been

extremely high, particularly with the EPA under Administrator Burford;' 0 8 second, the environmental interest groups pressing for new congressional efforts to achieve statutory objectives are relatively strong; and
third, public opinion continues to strongly support stringent environmental regulation. 0 9
Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 21, at 51 ("Most major regulatory agencies... represent
the principal source for Congress of information about regulatory problems."); Schoenbrod, supra
note 77, at 1278 (Congress "can request data from agencies before legislating.").
105. Congress relies on organizations like the Office of Technology Assessment, see, eg., S. REP.
No. 98-284, supra note 34, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 31, reprintedin 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5590, and the National Academy of Sciences, see, eg., H.R.
REP. No. 99-168, supra note 34, at 23; H.R. REP. No. 95-294, supra note 33, at 36-37, 39-40, 181,
reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1114-15, 1117-18, 1260. The 1984 RCRA
amendments were in many instances based on determinations made by state regulatory agencies
engaged in the management of hazardous waste. See S. REP. No. 98-284, supra note 34, at 17-18
(list of hazardous wastes for which EPA must consider banning land disposal based on California's
restrictions of those wastes); H.R. REP. No. 98-198, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 36, reprintedin 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5595 (citing California and Illinois statutory restrictions on
land disposal); id. at 70-71, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5630 (referring
to successful recycled paper procurement programs in Maryland, California, and Oregon).
106. See, e.g., Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress and Executive Policy-making: Notes on Three Doctrines, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 60 (Congress has passed detailed legislation
in tax field); Jaffe, supra note 90, at 1189-90 (same). But cf K. DAVIS, supra note 22, at 41 ("Even
the Internal Revenue Code, said to be our most detailed federal legislation, contains more than a
thousand express delegations, and through vague or inadequate language perhaps thousands
more."); McGowan, A Reply to Judicialization, 1986 DUKE L.J. 217, 224 (legislative efforts to regulate in detail have generally failed); Stewart, supra note 21, at 1695 n.127 (strong political incentives
for detailed legislation rare outside the tax field).
107. One such motivation has been OMB supervision of the EPA. See STATUTORY DEADLINES,
supra note 36, at 32 (recent survey of attorneys, agency officials, and others involved in making and
implementing environmental policy attributed "the increasing specificity of congressional directives
to EPA [to] a desire to limit OMB's role in EPA policy making"); see also Environmental Defense
Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 568-71 (D.D.C. 1986) (description of OMB's review of EPA
proposed rules). The same supervision applies to other regulatory agencies as well. See Exec. Order
No. 12,291 (1981), 3 C.F.R. 127, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1982).
108. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
109. These factors have allowed formation of the political consensus necessary for enactment of
detailed environmental legislation, even in areas, such as the choice of a new mechanism for financ-
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Nevertheless, Congress will likely continue to replace discretionary
statutes with alternative models of delegation in a variety of substantive
contexts. While the politics of regulation vary, situations comparable to
the one that prompted the EPA reforms have already arisen. For example, Congress in 1987 rejected Reagan administration plans to relax or
repeal many of the federal regulations that govern nursing home services,
by promulgating a statute to protect nursing home patients" 0 that is
"written in extraordinary detail, like an agency regulation.""' Similarly,
when Congress decided to mandate health warnings for smokeless tobacco, it required the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to promulgate
regulations according to precise instructions in the legislation. 112 When
the FTC promulgated a regulation inconsistent with those instructions, a
district court declared the regulation invalid on the ground that the
FTC's function under the statute is "largely ministerial" and the agency
3
does not have discretion to deviate from the legislative mandate."
Moreover, legislators and groups interested in substantive reform will
look to Congress's experience with the environmental laws for guidance.
This will probably lead Congress to apply legislative innovations such as
114
"hammers" to other agencies.
Although Congress has the capacity to broaden its use of the alternative models of delegated authority, it will not be able to replace the
traditional discretionary model in all situations in which it seeks to confine agency discretion. In certain contexts, Congress may be incapable of
accumulating the information necessary to adopt one of the alternative
models. In other situations, an inability to reach a consensus on detailed
legislation will thwart any attempt to use the alternative models. Thus,
although the conventional wisdom that institutional and political hurdles
make it impossible for Congress ever to legislate specifically has proven
erroneous, the conventional view undoubtedly remains accurate in some
ing Superfund, see 26 U.S.C. § 4611 (Supp. IV 1986), that have involved clear potential for significant redistribution of regulatory benefits and burdens. See, eg., Shabecoff, Toxic Waste Bills:
UnrelatedIssues SnarlResolution, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1986, at A22, col. 1 (proposed excise tax for
Superfund financing stalled by alliance of administration officials fearing administrative burdens and
rejection of "polluter should pay to clean up" principle, and liberal members of Congress opposed to

regressive nature of tax).
110. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 101 Stat.

1330, 1330-160 to -221 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1988)).
111. Pear, New Law ProtectsRights ofPatientsin NursingHomes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1988, at
1, col. 1.
112. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 3,
100 Stat. 30, 30-32 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (Supp. IV 1986)).
113. Public Citizen v. FTC, 688 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D.D.C. 1988).
114. Cf McGarity & Shapiro, OSHA Regulation: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1987, at
999, 1124-25 (discussing possible application of hammers to OSHA).
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situations. IIs
And Congress should not be blind to the alternative models' deficiencies. While the coercive model is the easiest of the three for Congress
to employ, 1 6 it is also the easiest to abuse. Burying an agency under a
mountain of deadlines will not help the agency to prioritize its regulatory
functions, and may reduce the quality of the agency's decisionmaking.
Imposing deadlines may enable legislators to strike a posture in favor of
regulation while avoiding the difficult policy choices that regulation entails. Finally, coercive legislation can shift policymaking responsibility
from elected legislators to unelected agency officials. Therefore, Congress must use the coercive model with restraint if it is to become an
effective and productive method of controlling agency discretion.
Increased legislative specificity is also an appropriate means of confining agency discretion, but it, too, can be abused. A specific substantive
mandate can reduce an agency's problem-solving flexibility. Reduced
flexibility can impair the agency's ability to provide optimal solutions to
regulatory problems, particularly in areas of limited information, or
when regulatory issues undergo rapid change.
Finally, although the new models reduce agency discretion, they
usually do not eliminate it. A coercive statute, for example, forces an
agency to act, but leaves it with discretion to determine the content of
regulation. Prescriptive legislation specifies the manner of regulation but
leaves the agency free to decide whether to regulate at all. Even ministerial legislation is likely to leave the agency with a range of regulatory
options, though that range will be narrower than under a discretionary
delegation.
The shortcomings of the alternative models should not force Congress to choose between two evils: Congress need not either resort to the
alternative models, even if they are ill suited to the problem at hand, or
abandon any attempt to confine agencies operating under discretionary
delegations. There is another option: Congress can leave an agency with
some discretion, under any of the four models, and rely on the courts to
police whatever discretion the agency retains. As we discuss below, however, the Supreme Court's recent decisions have made it less likely that
the courts will police agency discretion in a meaningful and effective
fashion. We therefore suggest that Congress supplement its use of the
alternative models with a series of statutory amendments to bolster the
115. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
116. Imposing statutory deadlines requires relatively little expertise and may not provoke as
much opposition as an attempt to dictate detailed legislative solutions to regulatory problems. For
these reasons, there are many more examples of coercive than prescriptive or ministerial control

devices in recent environmental legislation.
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courts' obligation and ability to assist in holding agencies accountable to
Congress's intent.
II.

THE SHIFT FROM ACTIVISM TO RESTRAINT IN JUDICIAL

REVIEW
While Congress has been moving to increase its control of administrative discretion, the Supreme Court has been moving in the opposite
direction. In the last ten years, the Court has redefined the nature of
judicial review of agency decisions by replacing the earlier judicial activism of the federal courts with judicial restraint. In so doing, the Court
has substituted an "executive implementation" approach to judicial review for the "checks and balances" model used in previous years. This
change has significantly reduced the role of the federal courts in limiting
delegated administrative discretion.
A.

Comparing Checks and Balances to Executive Implementation
Review.

The following chart indicates the parameters of the two approaches
to judicial review.

SUBJECT

Legislative
Authority for
Oversight
Procedural
Protections
Standing and
Jurisdiction
Statutory
Interpretation

CHECKS AND
BALANCES

EXECUTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION

Maximum
Minimum
availability
availability
availabilityavailability
Maximum
Minimum
availability
availability
Broad
Narrow
interpretation
interpretation
Minimum
Maximum
deference
deference

The Court's earlier approach emphasized the need to control administrative discretion by supporting legislative and judicial limitations on
such discretion.' 17 This approach, which this Article labels checks and
balances review, had four aspects. First, the Court construed relevant
constitutional limitations to maximize Congress's authority to oversee
administrative decisionmaking, even when such limitations were not for117. See generally Glicksman, A Retreat From JudicialActivism." The Seventh Circuit and the
Environment, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 209 (1987) (describing attributes of activist and restraint-oriented review).
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mally recognized by the Constitution.' 18 Second, the Court used the due
process clause to maximize the procedural protections available to statutory beneficiaries. 1 9 Third, the Court broadly interpreted standing doctrine and jurisdictional limits to maximize the number of beneficiaries
eligible to contest unfavorable agency decisions in court.1 20 Finally, the
Court gave only minimal deference to agencies' statutory interpretation
and implementation, in an effort to hold agencies more accountable to
legislative intent. 121
An entirely different conception of the relationship of the three
branches animates the Court's current restraint-oriented approach. This
view, which this Article labels the executive implementation approach,
values agency flexibility and executive autonomy, and decries judicial intrusion into executive-branch affairs. The view reverses all four of the
canons of activism. First, relevant constitutional limitations are construed to maximize executive autonomy, freeing administrative decisions
from legislative encumbrances not formally recognized by the Constitution.' 22 Second, the due process clause and the APA are construed to
minimize the procedural protections available to statutory beneficiaries, a
construction that speeds agency decisionmaking.123 Third, standing doctrine and jurisdictional limitations are used to minimize the number of
beneficiaries eligible to contest unfavorable agency decisions, which also
reduces judicial oversight of agency decisions.' 24 Finally, deference to
12 5
agencies' statutory interpretation and implementation is maximized,
thus extending executive autonomy and agency flexibility. The next section will outline this reversal of judicial activism in administrative law
and discuss the trend's merits.
B.

The Rise of Executive Implementation Review.

1. Separation of Powers Limitations. The Supreme Court's shift
in judicial philosophy is nowhere more apparent than in the Court's interpretation of how the Constitution limits congressional control of administrative discretion. The checks and balances approach interprets the
118. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text. Statutory beneficiaries were able to use
these procedural opportunities to build a more complete record before the agency, thereby increasing
the chance that they could convince a reviewing court that agency decisions clashed with the history
and policy goals of applicable statutes.
120. See infra notes 149-58, 169, 173 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 188, 196-97 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.

124. See infra notes 150-55, 159-68, 171-74 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 175-95, 198-203 and accompanying text.
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separation of powers doctrine to increase legislative oversight; the executive implementation approach reaches the opposite result.
Following the executive implementation approach, the Court in INS
v. Chadha12 6 curtailed a vigorous effort by some members of Congress to
127
establish a legislative veto provision for all administrative regulations.
By insisting that Congress exercise its policymaking authority before,
rather than after, agencies act, the Chadha Court limited Congress's au12 8
thority to control agency decisionmaking.
Some proponents of executive implementation review would also
strike down another postdelegation technique for limiting executive authority-restrictions on the President's authority to fire administrators. 29 Congress has limited the President's authority to dismiss some
126. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Court held that a one-House veto violates the constitutional
requirement of bicameralism (two-House approval of legislation). Id at 951. Moreover, the Court's
later summary affirmance of a lower-court decision made it clear that a two-House veto violates the
constitutional requirement of presentment (opportunity for President to veto legislation). United
States House of Representatives v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), affig mem. Consumers Union v.
FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (two-House veto of regulation issued by Federal Trade Commission (FrC) held unconstitutional); see also Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy
Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), aff'g mem. Consumers Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (one-House veto of FERC natural gas pricing regulations held unconstitutional).
127. See B. CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 56 (1988)
(House Judiciary Committee voted to favorably report generic legislative veto provision that would
have given either House right to review and possibly veto any new rule promulgated by nearly every
executive and independent agency). Individual veto provisions had been established for some regulatory agencies, such as the FTC, see United States House of Representatives v. FTC, 463 U.S. at
1216, and the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC), see Process Gas Consumers Group,
463 U.S. at 1216.
128. Chadha affects Congress's ability to influence regulatory discretion because without a veto
(or the ability to threaten one), members of Congress will have less leverage to direct administrators
concerning congressionally favored policy outcomes. See Bruff& Gellhorn, CongressionalControl of
Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1419 (1977)
(legislative veto gives members of Congress political leverage over agency decisions). For that reason, Chadhahas been criticized for needlessly invalidating an innovative and useful method of policing agency discretion. See, eg., Elliot, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the
Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 150; Spann, Deconstructingthe Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REv. 473, 491 (1984); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater?: A
Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 791. Other commentators have argued that the Court's action was appropriate because the veto exacerbated Congress's tendency to avoid difficult policy decisions whenever possible and to allow committee and
subcommittee chairpersons, or their staffs, to have a disproportionate role in the design of agency
policies. See, e.g., Bruff& Gellhorn, supra, at 1417-18; Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1207-09;
Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1979,
at 24-25.
129. See, eg., Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1397-1400 (D.D.C. 1986) (per curiam)
(recommending that Humphrey'sExecutor be overruled), afl'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986); Miller, IndependentAgencies, 1986 SuP. Cr. REv. 41, 96-97 (arguing that independent
agencies violate separation of powers); Scalia, HistoricalAnomaliesin AdministrativeLaw, 1985 SuP.
CT. HISr. Soc'Y Y.B. 103, 106-10 (questioning distinction between executive and independent agencies and contending that Humphrey's Executor should be limited to its factual and historical con-
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administrators to cases in which he has "cause," usually limited to "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 130 The Supreme
Court seems to have rebuffed criticisms of these restrictions in Morrison
v. Olson, which upheld as constitutional the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.131 The Court in Morrison rejected the argument that the President's inability to fire the
independent prosecutor except for cause was unconstitutional, relying on
earlier decisions upholding similar restrictions on the President's author132
ity to fire agency officials.
Thus, although Congress has lost the legislative veto, it can apparently influence agency decisionmaking by using "for cause" firing restrictions.1 33 Although both the legislative veto and "for cause" restrictions
increase Congress's authority over agency discretion, the Court has ac-

text); see also Giflord, The SeparationofPowers Doctrineand the RegulatoryAgencies After Bowsher
v.Synar, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 441, 467 (1987) ("As room for policy formulation increases,
congressional limitations upon presidential influence become problematic.").
130. Eg., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982) (limitation on presidential authority to fire Federal Trade Commissioners). See generally S. BREYER & PL STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 123-24 (2d ed. 1985) (listing agencies whose administrators cannot be fired except for cause).
In addition, the Supreme Court has indicated that administrators who engage in adjudication cannot
be fired except for "cause" even if Congress has not established such a restriction. See infra note 132
and accompanying text. Such agencies would include the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC),
the FCC, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEQ. See S.BREYER & K_ STEWART,
supra, at 123-24.
131. 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988).
132. The Court analogized the Ethics in Government Act's removal provisions to the removal
provisions declared constitutional in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(upholding legislative restriction on President's authority to remove FTC Commissioners), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (upholding legislative restriction on President's authority
to remove member of War Claims Commission). 108 S.Ct. at 2616. The Court interpreted those
cases as holding removal restrictions constitutional as long as they do not impede the President's
authority to perform his constitutional duties. Id. at 2619-20. The Ethics in Government Act did
not impede the President from carrying out those duties because an independent prosecutor is an
2), with limited
inferior officer (as defined by the appointments clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
jurisdiction and tenure, and without either policymaking or significant administrative authority. 108
S. Ct. at 2619.
133. Although the Court endorsed its prior cases holding "for cause" restrictions constitutional,
see supra note 132 and accompanying text, it did indicate some limitations on Congress's use of "for
cause" restrictions. It warned that Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding legislative
restriction on President's authority to remove postmaster unconstitutional), was "undoubtedly correct in its holding, and in its broader suggestion that there are some 'purely executive officials who
must be removable by the President at will if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role."
108 S. Ct. at 2618. This limitation, however, would not generally affect agency administrators, who,
in view of their rulemaking and/or adjudicatory power, are not "purely executive" officials. The
Court also stated that the restriction on firing the independent prosecutor was constitutional because
the President's need to control the independent prosecutor's exercise of discretion was not "so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that the
counsel be terminable at will by the President." Id. at 2619. Although it is unlikely that controlling
regulatory officials' discretion is "central to the functioning of the Executive Branch," the Court did
not tell what types of officials cannot be subject to a "for cause" removal restriction under that test.
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cepted only the weaker of the two postdelegation techniques, the firing
restrictions, as constitutional. 34 The Court's rejection of the stronger
technique in Chadha shows the Court's general commitment to an executive implementation approach in its application of constitutional
limitations.
2. HearingRights. By interpreting procedural rights, the Court
influences the ability of individuals to conform agency decisionmaking to
congressional intent. According to the checks and balances approach, if
statutory beneficiaries enjoy greater procedural protections, they can develop a more complete record before administrative agencies, which facilitates meaningful judicial review and makes agencies more accountable
for their decisions. The executive implementation approach, in contrast,
holds that additional procedures slow agency decisionmaking and do little to improve the quality of agency decisions. Following the executive
implementation approach, the Court has recently minimized the procedures to which statutory beneficiaries are entitled under both the due
process clause and the APA.
The Supreme Court's expansion of due process rights in the 1970s
136
was tied to a broad definition of the property 135 and liberty interests
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Expanded procedural entitlements were seen as an appropriate means of preventing agency decisions
inconsistent with legislative intent.' 37 Since that time, the Court has
made a sporadic, but clear retreat from its earlier positions. It has im134. When an agency is "independent," in the sense that the President cannot fire the agency's
administrator over a policy disagreement, the administrator is less likely to subordinate congressional demands to the White House's position on particular issues, and Congress thus enjoys greater

authority. See SENATE

COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIPs, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOLUME

5-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION, S. Doc. No. 91, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 28-43 (1977) (Congress
establishes independent agencies to insulate them from executive control and to make them more
susceptible to congressional control). This device, however, is weaker than the legislative veto,
which gives Congress, or one of its Houses, direct authority to reverse an agency's decision.
135. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978) (discontinuance of municipal utility services subjected to due process limitations); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
572-76 (1975) (expulsion from public schools must be carried out consistently with due process when
school attendance mandatory); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1970) (withdrawal of welfare benefits subject to due process when recipient originally considered eligible for benefits).
136. See, e.g, Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (individual's interest in good reputation is liberty interest);
see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (when person's honor or reputation is
impugned, opportunity to defend one's character is essential).
137. See Reich, IndividualRights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1252 (1965) (agency decisions influenced by public opinion may reach conclusions at variance
with legislative intent and therefore should be subjected to procedural safeguards); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 783 (1964) ("government largess should be subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedures").
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posed limitations on what constitutes a property 138 or liberty 139 interest
for due process purposes. The Court has also applied a balancing test to
determine what procedures an agency must provide, 14° and, using this
test, has minimized hearing requirements. 14 1 This retraction of due process rights was motivated by concerns that elaborate procedures were
inefficient and did little to make agencies' decisions more accurate.1 42
The expansion and contraction of procedural rights under the APA
reflect the same trend. A series of D.C. Circuit opinions in the 1970s in
43
effect imposed a paper hearing requirement for informal rulemaking.1
Several judges on the court also required agencies engaged in informal
rulemaking to use adjudicatory procedures that the APA does not ex138. See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 785-90 (1980) (nursing
home patients' property interest in receiving care not violated by forced relocation to another
facility).
139. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (freedom from corporal punishment is liberty interest, but Court will not require procedural safeguards when state "common-law
remedies are fully adequate to afford due process"); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-29 (1976)
(prisoner not deprived of liberty interest when transferred involuntarily from one prison to another;
state statute provided no right to remain in first prison).
140. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (to determine what procedures are
necessary, court must consider nature of private interest affected, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards").
141. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (only an informal meeting necessary before utility can terminate services for nonpayment of bills); Mathews, 424
U.S. at 343-49 (only an opportunity to contest decision in writing necessary before government can
terminate social security disability benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (only an informal meeting necessary before public school can suspend student). The Court previously required
more extensive procedures. See, eg., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (hearing similar to civil trial necessary before welfare recipient can be denied benefits).
142. See, e.g., Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975) (analyzing
elements of fair, efficient, and flexible administrative hearings and proposing a process for review of
agency decisions); Mashaw, The ManagementSide of Due Process: Some Theoreticaland Litigation
Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairnessand Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772 (1974) (arguing that normal adjudicatory processes are poorly
suited to social welfare context and that "quality assurance system" would more efficiently ensure
due process).
143. The D.C. Circuit broadly interpreted the APA's requirements of "adequate notice." See,
e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (agency must
give new notice if it significantly changes data or methodology on which it will base a rule); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (agency must reveal in notice of
rulemaking the data and methodologies on which it intends to rely), cert. denied sub nom. Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Train, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). The court also broadly interpreted the APA's requirement of a "concise general statement of... basis and purpose," 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). See Nova
Scotia, 568 F.2d at 252 (quoting Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338
(DC. Cir. 1968)); Portland Cement Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 393 (agency's failure to respond to public
comments in its statement of basis and purpose was ground for reversal); Boyd, 407 F.2d at 338
(statement of basis and purpose must allow court "to see what major issues of policy were ventilated
by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did").
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pressly require for that purpose. 144 Advocates of expanded procedural
entitlements argued that courts could better control agency discretion by
mandating procedures that parties could use to clarify disputed

contentions. 145
The Supreme Court halted the D.C. Circuit's efforts in Vermont
Yankee NuclearPower Corp. v. NRDC, by reversing a decision that compelled the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to employ formal
rulemaking procedures more demanding than those required by the
APA. 146 The Court held that federal courts could not impose procedural
requirements beyond those required by the APA "[a]bsent constitutional
constraints or extremely compelling circumstances."' 147 The Court regarded additional procedures as unnecessary and counterproductive because they hindered agency flexibility. 148
3. Appeal Rights.

The checks and balances approach regards the

right to appeal adverse agency decisions as a crucial means of policing
144. See, eg., NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (suggesting numerous
procedural devices to enable agency to generate more developed factual record), rev'd, Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("In informal rule-making, the record should
clearly disclose when each piece of new information is received and when and how it was made
available for comment. If information is received too late for comment, the agency must at least
clearly indicate how the substance of its consideration would be affected."), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251-54 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concluding that
existence of APA procedures does not preclude use of other adjudicatory procedures); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (submission of pre-screened written questions would illuminate factual disputes without unduly burdening process with inappropriate adjudicative procedures).
145. See, eg., NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d at 646 (additional procedures necessary to generate
record sufficient to allow court to determine whether agency action was arbitrary and capricious).
See generally Shapiro & Levy, supra note 30, at 404-07 (tracing evolution of proceduralism and
describing APA as compromise tolerating broad discretion checked by extensive procedural
safeguards).
146. 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978).
147. Id. at 543. The Court gave no indication what would constitute "compelling circumstances." Id. The lower federal courts have interpreted Vermont Yankee as discouraging the expansive use of 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) to require paper hearings. See, eg., Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
J.) (notice requirement in informal rulemaking requires disclosure only of "most critical factual
material" that agency will rely on).
148. See, eg., Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuitand the Supreme Court, 1978
Sup. Cr. REv.345, 387; see also Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 547 (adequacy of record not directly
linked to extensiveness of procedures employed; requiring additional procedures disrupts agency
enforcement); cf United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973) (procedures beyond those required for informal rulemaking unnecessary to adequately consider evidence
presented). See generally Bezanson, The Myths of Formalism: An Essay on OurFaith That Formalism Yields Fairness and Effectiveness in Public Administration, 69 IowA L. REv.957, 973 (1984)
(overindulgent and indiscriminate use of formalism eliminates individual judgment, reason, and discretion from decisionmaking).
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agency discretion. The executive implementation approach interprets
this right narrowly, minimizing the number of decisions appealed. Recent cases involving standing, jurisdiction, and private rights of action
also illustrate the Court's shift toward an executive implementation
approach.
a. Standing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court broadly
interpreted constitutional and statutory standing requirements, enabling
a wide variety of statutory beneficiaries to seek judicial review. 149 The
Court has since restricted standing in two ways. 1 50 First, it has made it
more difficult to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a case or controversy exist. A plaintiff must now show not only an injury in fact, but
also a causal relationship between that injury and the agency action challenged. 151 The Court actively uses this requirement to deny standing
15 2
when it doubts that a favorable verdict will alleviate a plaintiff's injury.
Second, even when a case and controversy does exist, the Court endorses
1 53
the use of prudential standing limitations, with their restrictive effect.
149. For example, in Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations v. Camp, the Court
held that a plaintiff could satisfy the article III case or controversy requirement by alleging that the
"challenged action caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise." 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). In
subsequent cases, the Court extended Data Processing'sexpansive definition of injury in fact: the
required injury could be environmental or aesthetic, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734
(1972), and the causal chain between the government decision at issue and the plaintiff's injury could
be quite attenuated, United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 685-90 (1973). The Court also held that a plaintiff would have standing,
even when Congress had made no specific provision for it, if she sought to protect an interest that
was "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." DataProcessing, 397 U.S. at 153. Prior to Data Processing, standing
doctrine required a plaintiff to allege injury of a legal interest derived from statutory or common law.
See, e.g., Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930); The Chicago Junction Case,
264 U.S. 258 (1924). See generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 19, § 5.4.1
(describing Supreme Court's early standing cases).
150. See generally Burnham, Injuryfor Standing Purposes When ConstitutionalRights Are Violated: Common Law Public Value Adjudication at Work, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57 (1985)
(describing Court's cycle of expansion and contraction ofstanding); Winter, The Metaphorof Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988) (same).
151. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978).
152. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976) (dismissing
challenge to IRS ruling allowing hospitals to retain tax-exempt status even if they regularly turned
away poor people seeking non-emergency care: even if plaintiffs won the case, "it is just as plausible
that the hospitals to which [plaintiffs] may apply for service would elect to forego favorable tax
treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain of any increase in the level of compensated
services"); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (dismissing equal protection challenge to suburban New York community's restrictive zoning because plaintiffs failed to establish that unavailability of low-priced housing was result of zoning practices at issue); see also City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 (1983) (holding that victim of police choke-hold lacked standing to enjoin
the practice because it was entirely speculative that he would again be subjected to it).
153. See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1984) (consumers lack
standing to seek judicial review of pricing orders issued by Secretary of Agriculture under Agricul-
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The Court's earlier expansion of standing rights permitted statutory
15 4
beneficiaries to raise additional legal challenges to agency decisions.
The Court's present standing restrictions increase executive autonomy
and agency flexibility by freeing agencies from judicial review and relegating disappointed statutory beneficiaries to the political system for

relief. 155

tural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 because consumer suits would prevent "equitable and expeditious ... testing [of] the validity of orders"). In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), the Court specified that a plaintiff
can claim standing based only on his "own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Id at 474 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).
The Court also indicated that a plaintiff's claims should not involve "'abstract questions of wide
public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches," id at 474-75 (quoting Worth, 422 U.S. at 499-500),
and noted that a plaintiff's complaint should fall within the "zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question," id. at 475 (quoting DataProcessing,
397 U.S. at 153). Although the Court has shown an increased willingness to restrict standing, not all
of its standing opinions reflect this willingness. In Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, for example, the Court made it easier for plaintiffs to satisfy the prudential requirement that a complaint
fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute in question. 479 U.S. 388,
400 & n.16 (1987) (in applying zone of interests test, court not limited to considering statute under
which plaintiff sues, but may also consider any related statutory provision that helps to determine
Congress's overall intent in enacting regulatory scheme). Nevertheless, in recent years the Court has
more often restricted standing than it has expanded it. See generally Burnham, supra note 150
(giving principled explanation for Court's apparently inconsistent approach to standing); Winter,
supra note 150 (suggesting underlying conceptual structure based on "human cognition" concepts to
explain Court's apparently incoherent positions on standing).
154. See, eg., E. HANKS, A. TARLOCK & J. HANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 214 (1974) (viewing removal of obstacles to standing as "the divorce of judicial
review from the core of common law jurisprudence and the recognition of a rather broad public
interest in the functioning of government"); Rosenbaum & Roberts, The Year of Spoiled Pork: Comments on the Court's Emergence as an Environmental Defender, 7 LAW & Soc'y REv. 33, 41 (1972)
(more expansive view of standing has permitted public interest litigation against government agencies); Stewart, supra note 21, at 1723 (expansion of standing allows affected interest groups to participate effectively in creation and review of agency decisions); Winter, supra note 150, at 1409
(describing Court's acceptance in early 19th century of public rights model of litigation).
155. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) ("[IThe absence of any particular
individual or class to litigate [certain] claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is
committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process."); Albert, Standing to ChallengeAdministrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogatefor Claimfor Relief 83 YALE L.J.
425, 496 (1974) (critics of liberalization of standing rules argued that Court had invited "practically
boundless interferences with agency decisionmaking"); Comment,JudicialReview of Agency Action:
The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 540, 547 & n.36 (1971) (liberal standing rules
may impede administrative efficiency); Note, Standing and the Propriety of Judicial Intervention:
Reviving a TraditionalApproach?, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 944, 944-45 (1977) (liberal standing rules
invite unelected, nonexpert judges to interfere with policymaking role of elected branches). But see
Winter, supra note 150, at 1503 (When issues raised by government decisions are not amenable to
resolution through the political process, standing law undermines the notion of accountability and
becomes "an undemocratic tool of exclusion.").
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The APA forbids judicial review when

"statutes preclude judicial review" or when "agency action is committed

to agency discretion by law." 156 In interpreting the exclusions, the Court
once presumed that judicial review was available 157 and adhered to the
view that Congress intended to preclude review only "in those rare instances" where there was "no law to apply."' 15 8 In Heckler v. Chaney, 159
however, the Court held that agency enforcement decisions are presumptively unreviewable as actions "committed to agency discretion by

law." 160 That presumption, said the Heckler Court, can only be rebutted
when a substantive statute provides guidelines for an agency to follow in

exercising its discretion.' 6'

Heckler touched off a continuing struggle over the proper categorization of hundreds of administrative actions. Courts have denied review
for a variety of enforcement 62 and other related decisions,1 63 including
156. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
157. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 14041 (1967) (judicial review of Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation would not be precluded by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) unless
there was "clear and convincing evidence" of congressional intent to prevent review).
158. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (construing 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
159. 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (appeal of FDA decision not to take enforcement action against use of
lethal drugs for capital punishment).
160. Id. at 834-35.
161. Id.
162. See, eg., Clementson v. Brock, 806 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986) (Secretary of Labor's
decision to forego enforcement action under Veterans' Readjustment Act held immune from review);
Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1986) (Attorney General has complete discretion to
detain alien if he believes deportation would be prejudicial to United States); Dina v. Attorney General of the United States, 793 F.2d 473, 476 (2d Cir. 1986) (no review of Attorney General's denial of
application for waiver of requirements for immigrants applying for permanent citizenship); International Union, UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (decision not to enforce LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act against employer not reviewable); Achacoso-Sanchez v.
INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1985) (Board of Immigration Appeals has complete discretion
to refuse to reopen deportation hearings); Rush v. Macy's New York, Inc., 775 F.2d 1554, 1558
(11th Cir. 1985) (FTC decision not to intervene in private dispute not reviewable).
163. These include decisions to settle a matter, see, eg., Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d
683, 685-87 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (FDA settlement of claim against company marketing unapproved
"new" drug held unreviewable); NAACP v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D.D.C. 1985) (no review
of Attorney General's decision to seek modification of consent decrees in civil rights actions), decisions to deny a government benefit, see, eg., Falkowski v. EEOC, 764 F.2d 907, 910-11 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Department of Justice has unreviewable discretion whether to provide counsel for government employee), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986), decisions to use property for government purposes, see, e.g., Florida Dep't of Business Regulation v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 768 F.2d
1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 1985) (Secretary of Interior's acquisition of land for Indian use unreviewable),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986), and decisions to deny a license, see, eg., Electricities of North
Carolina v. Southeastern Power Admin., 774 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (4th Cir. 1985) (no review of
Southeastern Power Administration's marketing decisions); see also Greenwood Utils. Comm'n v.
Hodel, 764 F.2d 1459, 1464-65 (11th Cir. 1985).
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refusals to initiate rulemaking proceedings.'" In a smaller number of
cases, courts have held either that Heckler did not apply to the enforcement decision at issue 165 or that it applied, but the presumption against
166
review was rebutted.
Other courts have not applied Heckler outside the enforcement context, however. See, eg.,
Getty v. FSLIC, 805 F.2d 1050, 1057-61 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (review of FSLIC's rebidding procedures);
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 792 (9th Cir.
1986) (review of claim that Secretary of the Interior acted outside his authority by unlawfully delegating authority to place oil and gas wells on Indian land); Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department
of the Navy, 783 F.2d 1072, 1078-80 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (review of Secretary of Navy's decision to
abolish preference for U.S. vessels to carry military cargo under Cargo Preference Act); Robbins v.
Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 46-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (review of Health and Human Services department's
action rescinding its commitment of funds to convert federal building into shelter for homeless).
164. See, eg., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 808 F.2d 12, 15
(6th Cir. 1986) (FDA decision not to promulgate tolerance level for dioxin in sports fish not reviewable); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1986) (EPA failure to initiate
regulation governing coke emissions under CAA not reviewable because of its discretionary nature).
But see American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[R]efusals to
institute rulemaking proceedings are distinguishable from other sorts of nonenforcement decisions
insofar as they are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and [are]
subject to special formalities, including a public explanation."); Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block, 771
F.2d 347, 351 (8th Cir. 1985) (refusal of Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate general regulation
implementing federal disaster program following state's request), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1012 (1986).
Courts seem to agree that Heckler's presumption of nonreviewability does not apply to promulgated rules, or to rulemaking proceedings that are abandoned. See, e.g., Farmworker Justice Fund
v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 625 (D.C. Cir.) (Secretary of Labor went beyond scope of authority in
relying on his notions of federalism to justify abandonment of proposed rule), vacated, 817 F.2d 890
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1488 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (undue delay in rulemaking schedule set by MSHA held reviewable); Humane Soc'y v.
Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing review of USDA regulation to determine if
hot-iron branding cruel to animals). But see Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Congress's long-standing acquiescence implied acceptance of Customs regulations that
were exercise of enforcement discretion), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
165. See, e.g., Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1517 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (CIA director's decision
to fire gay employee is reviewable), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988); Northern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 782 F.2d 730, 745 (7th Cir. 1986) (FERC refusal to investigate abusive
understatement of gas needed by pipeline customers under supply contract reviewable); Cardoza v.
CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1549 (7th Cir. 1985) (CFTC's decision not to review exchange disciplinary
actions reviewable); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(review of FCC mandatory order requiring MCI to forbear from filing tariffs reviewable); Heterochemical Corp. v. FDA, 644 F. Supp. 271, 273-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing review of FDA refusal to enforce Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act against violator of statute); Bresgal v. Brock, 637 F.
Supp. 280, 284 (D. Or. 1986) (Secretary of Labor enjoined from refusing to apply Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act to forestry workers), afd in part, modified in part,
833 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1987); Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldrige, 624 F. Supp. 1560, i571 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (Attorney General's grant of immunity under Exchange Trading Company Act not an enforcement action and thus reviewable), rev'd, 811 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1987).
166. See, e.g., Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1986) (code
sections limiting National Transportation Safety Board's inspection powers provided standards to
review Board's denial of plaintiff's participation in inspection of plane crash), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
67 (1987); Shelley v. Brock, 793 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (intent of Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act was not to preclude review of union members' complaints); Abourezk v. Reagan,
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The Heckler Court thought it improper for courts to limit executive

authority over enforcement decisions without a clear legislative declaration in favor of such judicial review.167 Such sentiments demonstrate the
68
Court's rejection of its prior checks and balances approach.1

c.

Private rights of action.

The expansion of implied statutory

private rights of action followed the Supreme Court's decision in J..
Case Co. v. Borak, in which the Court described a judicial responsibility

"'to adjust.., remedies so as to grant the necessary relief' when federally secured rights are invaded." 169 The lower federal courts followed

Borak by "generously conferr[ing] rights of action on private litigants." 170 In Cort v. Ash, however, the Court enunciated a new test for
determining when private rights of action are available in the absence of
express statutory authorization.17 1 The Court applied the Cort test in a

way that made it clear that Cort had "simply done away with implied
72
rights of action sub silentio. -1
785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Immigration and Nationality Act lists 33 distinct categories that
provide standards to guide Executive in its exercise of powers to exclude aliens), affid, 108 S. Ct. 252
(1987); Lorion v. NRC, 785 F.2d 1038, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (NRC decision not to suspend license
of nuclear plant after investigation); DuBois v. EPA, 646 F. Supp. 741, 744-45 (W.D. Mo. 1986)
(adopting view that EPA is bound to enforce Clean Water Act once a violation has been brought to
its attention), rev'd, 820 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1987); Doyle v. Brock, 632 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1986)
(intent of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act was not to preclude review of union
members' complaints), a.#'d, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Save Our Dunes v. Pegues, 642 F. Supp.
393 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (Coastal Zone Management Act and National Environmental Policy Act provided guidelines delineating enforcement powers of Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management), rev'd, 834 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1987); Sierra Club v. Block, 615 F. Supp. 44 (D. Colo. 1985)
(decision reviewable because act specified that secretary "shall" act upon certain events).
167. The Court argued that because enforcement decisions involve a difficult balancing of various factors, judicial review should not be lightly invoked. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. Moreover, the
Court noted, since decisions to indict are considered the special province of the executive branch,
judicial review of enforcement decisions, which have the same characteristics as decisions to indict,
raises a separation of powers problem. Id. at 832.
168. See, eg., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (APA
requires judicial review of any agency action). See generally R. CASS & C. DIVER, ADMINisTRATIVE LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 578 (1987) (Heckler "effectively creates an island of presumptive unreviewability in a sea of presumptive reviewability.").
169. 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)) (stockholder of
corporation involved in merger had implied right to damages and injunctive relief for violations of
section 14 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
170. Community & Economic Dev. Ass'n v. Suburban Cook County Area Agency on Aging,
770 F,2d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 1985).
171. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
172. Agency on Aging, 770 F.2d at 664; see, eg., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523,
527 (1984) (no private cause of action for derivative suits under section 36(b) of Investment Company Act of 1940); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S.
15, 21 (1982) (union has no federal claim for contract violation by employer who receives Urban
Mass Transportation Act funds); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers

Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981) (no private cause of action for back pay under Davis-Bacon Act);
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The Court originally endorsed implied private rights of action as a

means of enhancing checks and balances on agency enforcement decisions. 173 More recently, however, the Court has emphasized that implied
private rights of action create rights not recognized by the legislature,
disrupt an agency's ability to administer its programs in a centralized
and coordinated manner, and invite judges to make technical policy decisions that would be better made by expert administrators. 1 74

4. Scope of Review.

Judicial review of agencies' statutory inter-

pretation and implementation is the final area in which the Court has

shifted to an executive implementation approach. A checks and balances
approach to these functions minimizes deference to agency decisions in

order to hold agencies more accountable to legislative intent. An execuKissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 148-50 (1980) (no private
cause of action to redress violations of Federal Records Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 21-24 (1979) (strictly limited legal remedy, and no equitable relief, available
under Investment Advisors Act of 1940); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no
private cause of action under section 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979) (no private cause of action under Freedom of Information Act to
enjoin releases of properly disclosable documents); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977)
(tender offeror has no standing to sue offeree for damages under section 14(e) of Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424 (1975) (no private
cause of action under Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
In the cases following Cort, the Court focused almost exclusively on one of the four factors
enunciated in Cort as the new test-whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.
See, eg., Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 24 ("The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create any such remedy."); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 ("our task is limited solely to
determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action"). This change in emphasis has effectively eliminated the availability of implied private remedies, since "legislative history
is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a specific procedure
that the statute itself fails to mention." NationalSea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Private rights of action, it was believed, would augment agency resources, correct agencies'
failures to regulate, and protect statutory beneficiaries. See Borak, 377 U.S. at 432-33; Stewart &
Sunstein, PublicProgramsand PrivateRights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1195, 1214-15, 1226-28, 1289-90,
1313, 1315 (1982) (summarizing arguments of supporters of implied private rights of action); see also
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969) (private litigants may seek relief under
section 5 of Voting Rights Act of 1965). See generally Noyes, Implied Rights ofAction and the Use
andMisuse of Precedent, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 145, 147 n.12 (1987) (citing numerous articles concerning private rights of action).
174. See, eg., National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14-15, 18 (federal courts not authorized to
ignore congressional judgments on appropriate nature and extent of statutory enforcement); Touche
Ross, 442 U.S. at 578 (The issue whether a statute creates private enforcement rights is solely "one of
congressional intent, not ... whether this Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme
that Congress enacted into law."); see also O'Reilly, Deregulation and Private Causes of Action:
Second Bites at the Apple, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 235, 261 (1987) (marginal benefits from private
rights of action offset by high cost of less predictable regulatory outcomes). See generally Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 173, at 1199, 1207-12, 1218, 1221, 1290-93, 1301-02, 1317 (summarizing arguments of critics of implied private rights of action).
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tive implementation approach increases such deference in order to maxi-

mize agency flexibility and executive autonomy.
a. Statutory interpretation. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,

the Court announced a new two-part test for judicial review of administrative agencies' statutory interpretations. 175 Under Chevron a court

must first inquire, by "employing traditional tools of statutory construction,"1 76 whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue."' 177 If it has, the court must simply "give effect to the unam-

biguously expressed intent of Congress," regardless of the agency's
views. 17 8 If not, the court must determine whether the agency's interpre-

tation "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 179 If it is,
the court has no choice but to defer to that interpretation. 180
Chevron created the same general approach for judicial review of

rulemaking that the Court has long followed for judicial review of adjudication. 181 The Chevron framework, however, contains two subtle, but
175. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding validity of EPA regulation interpreting term "stationary
source" under CAA).
176. Id. at 843 n.9.
177. Id. at 842.
178. Id. at 843,
179. Id.
180. In Chevron, the Court accepted the EPA's conclusion that Congress did not have a specific
intention concerning whether the owner of a plant could alter a source of air pollution without
obtaining an operation and construction permit as long as the alteration would not result in a net
increase in pollution emissions from the entire plant. Id. at 857-58. Accordingly, the Court resolved
the case under the second prong of the two-part test. The definition of a "stationary source" in this
context required the EPA to reconcile Congress's desire to clean up the nation's air with its concern
that pollution control measures not prevent reasonable economic growth. See id. at 863. Because
the agency's interpretation of the statute reflected "a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests," it was "entitled to deference." Id. at 865.
181. When courts review agency adjudication, if Congress's intent is clear, the issue is a pure
question of law, appropriate for judicial resolution without resort to the agency's views. See Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (affirming judicial enforcement of NLRB order requiring employer to bargain with union); see also NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322
(1951) (definition of "union" is issue of law; thus, NLRB decision is open to judicial inquiry). When
Congress's intent is not clear, the issue becomes a mixed question of fact and law, and courts must
defer to the agency's views. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
Under Chevron, the inquiry whether the statute at issue is clear, which involves "traditional
tools of statutory construction," see, eg., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987), is a pure question of law on which no deference to
the agency's views is necessary or appropriate. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-44
(1987); Union of ConcernedScientists, 824 F.2d at 113. But see Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 452-55
(Scalia, J., concurring). If, owing to congressional silence or ambiguity on the precise issue, the
statute is not deemed clear, then the agency's interpretation will involve either (1) resolution of a
mixed question of fact and law, or (2) application of broader statutory purposes to resolve a question
that the legislature never envisioned or chose to ignore. In either case, the court must defer to the
agency's views in resolving the question. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45, 865-66 (courts must defer
to agencies' resolution of conflicting statutory policies within realm of agencies' expertise); Cardoza-
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important departures from traditional principles of judicial review; these
changes have reduced judicial control of agency discretion in the
rulemaking context.
First, Chevron effectively creates a presumption of statutory ambiguity-a presumption that is difficult to rebut. 18 2 A case satisfies the first

part of the Chevron test only if Congress's intent is "unambiguously"
clear. 18 3 As a result, a court can treat a question of statutory interpretation as a pure question of law, resolvable without reference to the
agency's views, only if there is no ambiguity involved.1 84 Since few statutes are absolutely clear, courts will likely move to the second part of the
Chevron test in most cases.' 8 5
Second, if a court decides that Congress's intent is unclear, and that

the case must therefore be decided under Chevron's second step, it will be
more difficult to convince the court that the agency's interpretation is
impermissible. 18 6 More than three years after Chevron, the Court "has
Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448 (courts must defer to agencies' case-by-case application of ambiguous statutory terms to different factual situations, a process that agencies must perform to fill legislative gaps).
182. Professor Sunstein has described Chevron as placing "a thumb on the scales in favor of the
agency." JudicialReview of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353,
371 (1987) (Panel Discussion) [hereinafter Judicial Review] (remarks of Prof. Sunstein).
183. See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 129 (1985); Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843.
184. JudicialReview, supra note 182, at 360 (remarks of Judge Starr); see, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980-81 (1986) (federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act found
ambiguous; FDA's interpretation "sufficiently rational to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the FDA").
185. In cases citing Chevron, the Court has found about twice as many statutes ambiguous as
unambiguous. For cases ruling statutes ambiguous, see Lukhard v. Reed, 107 S. Ct. 1807, 1814
(1987); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 425 (1987); Clarke v.
Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y,
478 U.S. 221,233 (1986); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 167 (1986); Young, 476 U.S. at 980; United
States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 667 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985); Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 657 (1985); Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maint. v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 530 (1985); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. at 129;
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985).
For cases ruling statutes not ambiguous, see Amoco Prods. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 107 S.Ct.
1396, 1409 (1987); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446-48; CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841-43
(1986); United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605 (1986);
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 431 (1986); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986); Bennett v. Kentucky Dep't of Educ., 470
U.S. 656, 666 (1985); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1984).
186. The core of the Chevron opinion is the Court's lecture to the courts of appeals to refrain
from second-guessing legitimate policy choices made by agencies charged with implementing statutes. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; see also American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 540-41 (1981) ("The judicial function does not extend to substantive revision of regulatory
policy. That function lies elsewhere-in Congressional and Executive oversight or amendatory legislation.") (quoting Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 663 (1980)
(Burger, C.J., concurring)).
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[never] cast a vote against an agency under Chevron Step Two."187 The
Chevron test compels this result. The second step requires a court to

determine whether an agency's decision reflects a permissible construction of the statute at issue. Since a court applying step two will already
have found under step one that Congress has expressed no specific intent

on the particular issue, the court can implement step two only by comparing the agency's decision to Congress's general intent in passing the
statute. Before Chevron, when statutes were vague or ambiguous, courts

would also compare the agency's decision to Congress's general intent,
but considered the inquiry a purely legal one and thus accorded the

agency no deference. 188 Under Chevron, courts perform the same func18 9
tion as before, but must defer to the agency's interpretation.

Because Chevron represents a new approach to statutory interpreta-

tion, the Court has not yet determined how much deference Chevron requires. The Court has given conflicting signals regarding when a court
187. JudicialReview, supra note 182, at 366 (remarks of Judge Starr); see Lukhard, 107 S.Ct. at
1816; Wright 479 U.S. at 431-32; Clarke, 479 U.S. at 409; Schor, 478 U.S. at 841-43; American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. at 239-40; Atkins, 477 U.S. at 162; Young 476 U.S. at 981; City of Fulton,
475 U.S. at 668; Riverside Bayview Home% 474 U.S. at 134; Cornelius,472 U.S. at 662; Connecticut
Dep't of Income Maint. v. Heckler, 471 U.S. at 538; Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. at
129-30.
188. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965) (NLRB's ruling that National Labor
Relations Act prohibited lockout of members of striking union overturned because court interpreted
Act differently). The Warren Court warned that "[t]he deference owed to an [agency's] expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by
an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress." American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965); see also Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 865-66 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (court will not defer to agency interpretations of statutes unless good reasons for deference exist), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). Even in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111 (1944), when the Court generally deferred to agency resolutions of mixed questions of fact and
law, the Court performed its own analysis of statutory purposes and inquired whether the agency's
definition of the statutory term "employees" was consistent with those purposes. See id. at 123-29.
189. Justice Scalia interprets the first branch of Chevron as an even more significant departure
from traditional principles of judicial review. In Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 453-55, (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (reviewing INS's interpretation of its authority to grant asylum to aliens), Justice Scalia
disputed the majority's position that "courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that
of an agency whenever, '[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,' they are able to
reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute." Id. at 454 (quoting id. at 442
(majority opinion)). Since the Court has indicated that courts must use these "traditional tools" in
determining whether a statutory interpretation case is governed by step one or step two of Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843 n.9, Justice Scalia must be arguing that courts must defer to the agencies even on the
question whether a statutory provision is clear. This reading of Justice Scalia's opinion is borne out
by his insistence that the Chevron Court drew no distinction between pure questions of law (which
include the question whether a statute is clear) and mixed questions of law and fact, and that judicial
deference is just as necessary in resolving the former kinds of questions as the latter. See 480 U.S. at
454-55 (Sealia, J., concurring). The majority in Cardoza-Fonseca, however, seems to have rejected
Justice Scalia's position. Justice Stevens described INS's argument that its interpretation deserved
deference as "misconstru[ing] the federal courts' role in reviewing an agency's statutory construction." Id. at 443.
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should move to step two of the analysis. In some cases, the Court asks
whether Congress has directly and unambiguously addressed the precise
question at issue. 190 In others, it inquires only whether Congress has
expressed an "intent" on the question in general.1 9 1 Under the first interpretation, a court would move to step two if there is any ambiguity concerning legislative intent. Under the second interpretation, a court
would move to step two if it could not resolve any ambiguity by employing traditional tools of statutory construction. The first approach would
result in greater deference to agencies' statutory interpretation, by mak92
ing it more likely that a court would move to step two of Chevron. 1
Moreover, the Court has not fully identified what factors courts should
take into account in applying step two. 193 For example, the Court has

not indicated how much weight courts should give traditional factors
that pre-Chevron decisions considered as weighing for or against defer190. See, e.g., Young, 476 U.S. at 974. In Young, the FDA asserted that 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982)
was ambiguous because it contained a dangling participle. 476 U.S. at 979. The court of appeals
rejected the FDA's claim and decided that the statute was unambiguous under step one of Chevron.
Although the Court admitted that the court of appeals' reading "may seem to be the more natural
interpretation," it made no attempt to develop its own interpretation of the statute by resorting to
the legislative history or other methods of interpretation. Id. at 980-81. Instead, it agreed that the
dangling participle created an ambiguity, and, having identified an ambiguity, moved immediately to
step two of Chevron. Id. at 981.
191. See, eg., NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413,
421 (1987) ("On a pure question of statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'traditional tools of statutory construction.' ").
192. The lower federal courts have expressed considerable confusion concerning step one. Judge
Edwards contends that courts should resolve a question of statutory interpretation under the first
step of Chevron as a pure question of law, even if "the provision at issue admits of some ambiguity,"
unless the court cannot discern congressional intent after employing traditional tools of statutory
construction. International Union, UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 765 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987). On the
other hand, Judge Mikva, relying on Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 421, interprets Chevron as requiring a court to move to step two only if the issue is one of mixed law and fact. If the issue is a pure
legal question, an agency is not entitled to deference, even if congressional intent is unclear. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1183 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see id. at 121 (Williams, J., concurring)
(protesting Judge Mikva's "unceremonious[ ] dumping [of] our rule of deference to reasonable
,agency interpretations in areas of statutory ambiguity").
193. Chevron merely provided examples of the factors to be considered: the complexity and
technical nature of the regulatory scheme, whether the agency considered the matter in a detailed
and reasonable fashion, and whether the interpretation involved reconciling conflicting policies. 467
U.S. at 865. Chevron also indicated that the substantive reasonableness of the program in question
was a factor. Id. at 845 (issue under step two is whether the "Administrator's view that [the interpretation or regulation] is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one").
In other cases, the Court has under step two considered whether the agency had relevant expertise,
see, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 618, 643 n.30 (1986) (suggesting that deference
accorded EPA's interpretation in Chevron was "predicated on expertise"); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985), and whether the agency properly considered the
factors that it should have considered, see, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1984).
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ence to agencies' interpretations. 194 The range of factors that a court can
consider plays a major role in determining how much deference an

agency's statutory interpretation will receive.
While Chevron's effect is not yet fully known, it seems clear that the
Court has adopted the executive implementation approach by substantially narrowing the instances in which a court should refuse to defer to
an agency's interpretation of a statute,1 95 and that the Court has done so

to maximize agency flexibility and autonomy. Chevron amounts to a rejection of the checks and balances approach, which considers independ-

ent review of an agency's interpretation necessary to ensure that the
agency's actions are consistent with legislative intent.
b. Statutory implementation. The Court has rejected its earlier
approach to statutory implementation as well. Under that approach,

once a court determined a statute's meaning, it vigorously applied the
statute to the facts at issue, according little deference to agency decision-

making. In a 1971 decision, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v.
Volpe, the Court signaled a willingness to scrutinize carefully how agencies applied statutes in particular factual contexts. 196 Prompted by Overton Park, lower federal courts used this new, heightened scope of judicial
review in a variety of ways, which became known collectively as the

"hard look doctrine."'

97

Although the Court has retained some elements of the hard look

doctrine, in recent years it has applied the doctrine in a more restrained
194. These factors would include "whether the agency's interpretation was adopted contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute; whether the Congress had rejected measures to modify the
agency's interpretation ...; and whether the agency's interpretation was a consistent and longstanding one or whether the agency ha[s] vacillated in its interpretation." Hochberg, Two-Step Method of
Analysis: Still in Transition After Chevron, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1988, at 26, col. 3.
195. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
196. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (stating that "the generally applicable standards of [5 U.S.C.]
§ 706 require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry" and that, while an agency's
action enjoyed a presumption of regularity, that presumption would not "shield [agency] action from
a thorough, probing, in-depth review").
197. The task, said some courts, was to ensure that the agency had engaged in "reasoned decisionmaking." E.g., Amercian Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing Essex
Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 416 U.S. 969 (1974)); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). Others referred to the courts' obligation to
inspect agency decisions pursuant to "a more searching standard" or "a more penetrating inquiry."
E.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973). The "hard look" label
originated in a case in which Judge Leventhal described hard look review as judicial review of
agency reasoning "with vigilance." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); see Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking
and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511 (1974).
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fashion. In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, the Court gave extreme deference to an NRC decision that storage of nuclear wastes would
not pose a serious long-term environmental hazard. It noted that when
an agency "is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at
the frontiers of science ... [the judiciary] must generally be . . . 'most
deferential'." 198 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 199 the
Court afforded less deference to a decision by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to revoke a regulation that
would have required automatic seatbelts or airbags in every passenger
automobile. 2°° The Court established guidelines for hard look review
that limited the scope of such review. It stated that an agency rule is
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not20be1 ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.
The Court emphasized that it intended hard look review to be deferential, and, calling its scope of review "narrow," the Court indicated that it
would not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency" 20 2 and would
"uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may
20 3
reasonably be discerned."
C.

The Merits of JudicialReview.

The Supreme Court has reversed much of its prior judicial activism.
Area by area, it has abandoned, or at least reduced, judicial control of
administrative discretion. Those who support the Court's movement toward restraint-oriented review argue that such review is superior to judicial activism both as a normative and as an instrumental matter.
Although these arguments deserve serious consideration, they do not justify several aspects of executive implementation review.
Supporters of judicial restraint argue as a normative matter that because agencies are more politically accountable than federal judges, deference to agency decisions promotes a more democratic system of
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
(1974)).

462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Id. at 43-46.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
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decisionmaking. 2° 4 Some carry this argument one step further, arguing

for the outright elimination of judicial review in some contexts. Justice
Scalia, for example, supports a restrictive interpretation of standing because such an interpretation would increase agencies' political
20 5
discretion.
These arguments contain three fallacies. Supporters of restraint erroneously assume, first, that if the representative branches decide a mat-

ter, the decision will be democratic; second, that applying the same scope
of review to legislative and administrative decisions will satisfy the principle of separation of powers; and third, that the arguments for restraint-

oriented review also justify a narrow conception of jurisdiction.
Commentators who favor judicial restraint stress that agencies are
more politically accountable than federal judges because the political system can influence agency decisions. The goal of activist review, however,
is not to give the power to make policy decisions, which are inherently
political, to unelected judges. The checks and balances approach to judicial review allows courts to determine whether agencies' policy decisions
are consistent with legislative intent.206 This serves a democratic pur-

pose, because the other branches of government often fail to ensure an
agency's compliance with legislative objectives. Agencies do respond to
legislative oversight, but that oversight is usually unsystematic and superficial. 20 7 Further, although agencies are subject to supervision by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), OMB may seek to implement
policies that contradict congressional goals. In any case, since presiden-

tial oversight is normally carried out by unelected bureaucrats whom the
President does not directly supervise, OMB's actions present the same
204. See, eg., Pierce, The Role of Constitutionaland Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64
TEx. L. REV. 469, 520-21 (1985). Supporters of judicial restraint applaud Chevron because it requires deference to an agency's statutory interpretation, id at 505-06, and criticize State Farm because it requires heightened scrutiny of an agency's policy decisions. See, eg., Shapiro, APA: Past,
Present,Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 472 (1986) (requiring agencies to prove deliberate decisionmaking "is nothing less than a hymn to substantive economic due process"). But see Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions ofLaw and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 372-94 (1986) (arguing that while
Chevron gives too much deference to agencies, State Farm gives too little).
205. See Scalia, The Doctrine ofStandingas an EssentialElement ofthe Separation ofPowers, 17
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 889 (1983); Scalia, Rulemaking As Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. Rv. v, v-vi
(1982) (agency decisions should reflect "manifestations of the popular will through the political
process" and not agencies' interpretation of "goals no more specific than 'the public interest, convenience, and necessity'" as interpreted by "some isolated think-tank without regard to what the public
wants").
206. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
207. Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1200-03; see also Levin, Administrative Discretion,Judicial Review, and the Gloomy World of Judge Smith, 1986 DUKE L.J. 258, 272-73; McGarity &
Shapiro, supra note 53, at 159 (while Congress has closely monitored EPA, from 1982 to 1987,
Senate has conducted only two oversight hearings concerning OSHA's failure to regulate).
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accountability problem as decisions by unelected administrators. 20 8
Once one thinks of judicial review as a way to compensate for limitations in the other branches' performance, it becomes clear that the de-

bate over the function of judicial review is not about whether courts
should make policy decisions. It is about the degree of deference that
courts ought to afford an agency's decisions. Over-deferential judicial
review can leave agencies free to ignore legislative policy. 209 At the same
time, review can become so nondeferential that judges substitute their
policy preferences for the agencies'. The difficult problem facing courts
that review agency decisions is how to find a middle ground between

those two undesirable alternatives.
Those who would cut back judicial review also believe that the principle of separation of powers demands highly deferential review.2 10 Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation of the United States v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. rejected this argument precisely because agencies are not Congress and are not entitled to the presumption
of correctness that Congress enjoys. 2 1' Because agencies are not directly
subject to the same checks and balances as an elected Congress, judicial
review of agency decisions cannot be as deferential. Courts must apply

stricter scrutiny to the decisions of nonelected officials. 212

Some might object, however, that State Farm's application of

heightened scrutiny to agencies' policy decisions conflicts with Chevron's
208. See Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1064 (1986); Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 456-59 (1987).
209. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 75 (1985); see
"Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking." Address by Clark Byse, ABA Section of Administrative
Law (Oct. 10, 1980), quoted in S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 130, at 273 ("If our independent judiciary is to perform this role of keeping the agency within its statutory limits, surely the
court-not the agency-must decide what the statute means.... [A]ccepting the view of one of the
litigants concerning the meaning of the statute so long as the meaning is not irrational or unreasonable, is, it seems to me, an abdication of judicial responsibility.").
210. See, eg., Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight ofAdministrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427,
430; Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-ChevronEra, 3 YALE J. oN REG. 283, 300-01 (1986).
211. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 n.9 (1983), the Court rejected the argument that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of review is equivalent to the rational relation test applied to statutes: "We do not view as equivalent
the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of
regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate." See Bowen v. American Hosp.
Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986) (plurality opinion) (State Farm rejected application of the minimum
rationality test because the "recognition of Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with
it the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision
212. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 30, at 429 (courts promote democratic values by "recognizing that legislators and agency bureaucrats occupy different positions in our scheme of government
and therefore must be treated differently for purposes of judicial review").

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:819

requirement of considerable deference to agencies' legal conclusions. 2 13
Supporters of judicial restraint would modify State Farm to require deference to agencies' statutory implementation. 2 14 But it is Chevron, not
State Farm, that requires modification. When construed to require extreme deference to an agency's statutory interpretation, 2 15 Chevron gives
administrators the power to decide the scope of their own authority. Allowing such a practice violates the idea of separation of powers. 2 16
Finally, interpreting standing doctrine restrictively to bring about
judicial deference is also inappropriate. Unless persons adversely affected by an agency's decision have standing to seek review, the decision
may go unchallenged. In such circumstances, courts have no opportunity to examine the decision for consistency with the substantive and procedural limitations that Congress has imposed on the agency.2 1 7
Proponents of restrictive standing respond that statutory beneficiaries
can always take their complaints to the political system,2 1 8 but that system often ignores such complaints.2 1 9 In sum, restrictive standing
clashes with the legitimating principle of agency government-that agen-

cies operate according to legislative intent. 220

213. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 204, at 397 (State Farm and Chevron produce anomaly because
courts required to defer to agency's legal decisions, but not to its factual ones); Shapiro, supra note
204, at 478-79 (aggressive judicial review of policy choices inconsistent with deferential review of
agency interpretations of law).
Professor Strauss suggests that Chevron and State Farm are complementary if one thinks of
Supreme Court review as a management function. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resourcesfor JudicialReview of Agency Action,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1130 (1987). He explains that because deference to an agency's statutory
interpretation is likely to produce nationwide uniformity in the administration of statutes, Chevron
reduces the need for the Court to use its scarce resources to police circuit court decisions for accuracy. Id. at 1121. In contrast, the legal effect of remand under State Farm is limited to the particular proceeding at issue; State Farm remands thus cannot generate the kind of conflict among the
circuit courts produced by disagreements over statutory interpretation. Id. at 1131. These facts
notwithstanding, Professor Strauss is uncomfortable with the degree of deference created by Chevron
and generally supports the approach indicated in State Farm. Id. at 1131-35. Professor Strauss'
insight, however, does suggest that our proposal that Congress modify Chevron might create a management problem for the Supreme Court.
214. See, eg., Shapiro, supra note 204, at 478-79.
215. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
216. Sunstein, supra note 208, at 467.
217. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 205.
219. See T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITY 85-97 (1969) (government policy decisions will favor the few persons represented in
policymaking process by interest groups and disfavor the many who are not); M. OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 125-31 (2d ed.
1971) (groups will not be formed to represent all citizens affected by public policy decisions).
220. See Winter, supra note 150, at 1513. Winter argues that the current, narrow conceptions of
standing are inconsistent with democratic principles of self-governance in that "the Court inevitably
decides what rights citizens have to demand that government behave according to the general will.
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Yet, even if supporters of judicial restraint acknowledge the democratic shortcomings of agency government, they oppose checks and balances review on instrumental grounds. They argue that activist review
impedes the formulation of good public policy in two ways. First, they
say, courts are prone to demand a higher degree of rationality from agencies than is necessary or appropriate for making public policy decisions.
Second, the critics of judicial activism assert, judges tend to replace agencies' viewpoints about what constitutes appropriate public policy with
their own.
Supporters of judicial restraint consider the heightened scrutiny
mandated by State Farm a mistake. They claim that the courts are likely
to confuse the "fits, starts, and reversals of real decision-making" with
' 22 1
"the fumblings of an incompetent or misguided administrator."
Moreover, in their view, courts may not appreciate an agency's need to
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, may misunderstand the
technical information contained in an agency record, or may fail to realize that an agency has compromised in a way that is difficult to explain
222
logically.
Even if these dislocations occur, they do not justify eliminating State
Farm. In our system, agencies may respond to political influence, as
long as their decisions comport with applicable statutory constraints.
When a statute expresses those constraints in broad and vague terms,
State Farm allows courts to determine whether the agency is acting in a
manner authorized by Congress under the statute. If the agency cannot
articulate a policy that justifies its action or demonstrate the consistency
of its action with existing agency policy, Congress has not authorized the
action. 223 Instead of eliminating State Farm, a more promising response
to the difficulties created by judicially imposed rationality requirements is
to vary the intensity of review depending on the nature of the agency
Yet, the Court does so without accounting to the public for its reasoning. This system is more
undemocratic than adjudicative norm-making; it takes control of government out of the hands of

government's constituents." Id.
221. Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4
YALE J. ON REG. 257, 294 (1987). These critics also argue that State Farm is self-defeating because
administrators will prepare elaborate rational-analytical accounts of their decisions in an effort to
withstand judicial review rather than to reveal the agency's real process of decision. See, eg., id. at
294; Shapiro, supra note 204, at 478.
222. Breyer, supra note 204, at 389; DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: JudicialReview in the
Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. Rlv. 399, 441-44 (1986).
223. Levin, supra note 207, at 271; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 30, at 428-30; Sunstein, supra
note 208, at 471, 473; cf Strauss, supra note 213, at 1133 (Denying the appropriateness of a court's
role in requiring an agency to articulate a policy reason for its actions results in "an impoverished
judicial role, indeed.").
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decisionmaking at issue.2 2 4
Furthermore, when supporters of judicial restraint argue that State
Farm ignores the reality of administrative decisionmaking, they overlook
the similar problems created by Chevron. Chevron's attempt to reduce
statutory interpretation to a simple verbal formula ignores the reality
that statutory interpretation involves many different statutes and applications of those statutes to different substantive problems in different legal
225
postures that statutory beneficiaries raise in seeking judicial review.
Unless courts take these differences into account, they will reach
counterproductive or senseless results. 226 The Supreme Court appears to
have recognized this problem; indeed, it sometimes interprets Chevron to
require a more complex inquiry into the appropriateness of deferring to
27
an agency's interpretation. 2
Even if supporters of judicial restraint admit the problems with executive implementation review, they contend that whenever courts engage in less deferential review, judges will inevitably imbue their
decisions with their own policy preferences.2 28 However, the evidence
concerning the judges' failure to defer to agency decisions is mixed.
Courts affirm almost ninety percent of agency decisions, and State Farm
has not changed this overall affirmance rate.2 2 9 Nevertheless, any administrative law commentator can point out numerous instances of judicial
overreaching. 230 In the most recent year measured, the D.C. Circuit,
224. See, e.g., Diver, Policymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393,
431-33 (1981) (rationality test should be applied in stable regulatory environments, when small errors in policy can cause catastrophic harm, and in policy regimes that involve egregious and irremediable misallocations of political power); Pierce, supra note 204, at 525 (decisions by agencies under
direct supervision of President should receive greater deference). But see Murchison, Moments of
Silence in Administrative Law: Notes on JudicialMethod in the DeregulationCases, 60 TUL. L. REv.
697, 746-49 (1986) (criticizing judges who vary intensity of review based on political environment in
which agency operates).
225. Breyer, supra note 204, at 373.
226. Id.; Sunstein, supra note 208, at 466.
227. Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretationof Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 986, 999 n.104 (1987) (citing Supreme Court cases that have invalidated agency
interpretations of statutes without relying on Chevron).
228. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 204, at 478 (judges applying rationality tests "have tended to
confuse their own policy preferences with deliberative truth").
229. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 30, at 438 n.242 (citing rates of reversal in 1982-1986 Annual
Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts); see also Cass,
Looking With One Eye Closed: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1986 DUKE L.J. 238, 254
(courts affirm "overwhelming majority" of administrative decisions they review); McGowan, A Reply to Judicialization, 1986 DUKE L.J. 217, 235 (indicating little evidence that courts have used State
Farm to reverse agency decisions at higher rate than normal).
230. See, eg., McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1082-83 (criticizing Forging Indus. Ass'n
v. Secretary of Labor, 748 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd en banc, 773 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985)
(reversal for failure to give any deference to OSHA policy decision)); Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to OccupationalDisease The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 GEo. L.J.
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which hears one-quarter of all appeals from agency decisions, affirmed
agencies only thirty percent of the time.23 1 In addition, the composition
of panels in the D.C. Circuit tends to determine the outcome in concrete
cases. 232 Judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely to
reverse agency policies at the behest of individuals, 233 while judges appointed by Republican presidents are more likely to reverse agency policies challenged by business interests_'L4 Commentators assert that this
pattern shows how judges use activist techniques to serve ideological
235
purposes.
The state of affairs in the D.C. Circuit is disquieting, but it does not
justify rejecting an activist approach to judicial review. The D.C. Circuit
often fails to give any deference to agencies. In contrast, activist review,
when properly applied, is deferential. Chevron's two-step test is in principle unobjectionable; the problem is that courts sometimes interpret
Chevron in ways that cause them to ignore relevant legislative intent. In
such cases, reviewing courts fail to enforce applicable legislative restraints; as a result, the agencies determine their own power to act. Activist review would interpret Chevron to require a more complex inquiry
into the appropriateness of deferring to an agency's interpretation. Activist review would not, however, give courts a license to find legislative
intent where none exists.
In addition, the Court in State Farm stressed that a court should
remand an agency decision only if the agency has committed a fundamental error in its reasoning process. 236 D.C. Circuit judges, and to a
lesser extent, judges in the other circuits, sometimes seize on inconsequential defects in an agency's reasoning process as a reason for remanding a case to the agency. 2 37 This probably occurs because the Supreme
Court has sent confusing signals about the degree of scrutiny that State
Farm requires. 23 8 The Court can resolve this confusion by overruling
1231, 1261 n.260 (1984) (criticizing Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980) (plurality opinion), for misunderstanding nature of risk assessment).
231. Pierce, Two Problems in AdministrativeLaw: PoliticalPolarity on the Districtof Columbia
Circuit and JudicialDeterrence ofAgency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 304-05 (1987 data).
232. See id at 306-07.
233. Id. at 302.
234. Id. at 302, 305.
235. See, eg., id. at 304-07.
236. See Levin, supra note 207, at 265 (State Farm is intended to "intercept the most blatantly
irrational agency decisions-ones that fail to display even minimal regard for facts, logic, agency
precedent, etc."); supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
237. See Pierce, supra note 231, at 304-06.
238. The State Farm Court found NHTSA's rescission of a regulation requiring manufacturers
to install passive restraints-either airbags or automatic seatbelts---arbitrary and capricious because
the agency failed to consider amending the regulation to require only airbags, even though it acknowledged that their presence in automobiles would save many lives. 463 U.S. 28, 48-49 (1983).
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circuit court opinions that fail to apply State Farm according to its
limits. 239
Critics think it "idealistic" to believe coturts can perform activist review in a manner that would prevent judges from being influenced by
their policy preferences. 24° If judges will inevitably manipulate activist
doctrines in order to implement their own policy preferences, the only
choice may be to abandon State Farm.241 But the fault may not lie with
activist review. Judges driven to implement their policy preferences can
manipulate restraint-oriented doctrines to the same end. 242 Moreover,

whether or not activist doctrines are used, the amount of deference
judges will accord agency decisions will vary with judicial perceptions
2 43
about the nature of a problem and an agency's degree of expertise.

Inevitably, these perceptions are influenced by a judge's ideology. 244
This conclusion is consistent with the Court's statement that it will remand a case only when an
agency's reasoning process shows a fundamental flaw. Id. at 42. An alternate holding, however,
reflects less deference to NHTSA. The Court also rejected NHTSA's conclusion that evidence of
safety benefits from automatic seatbelts was too inconclusive to support the regulation. Id. at 52. To
reach this conclusion, the Court engaged in an in-depth analysis of the reasoning offered by NHTSA.
Id. at 52-56. Thus, the Court appears to have rejected its own admonition in Baltimore Gas & Elea
Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983), that courts should defer to an agency that is making a
decision "within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science." For a possible way to
reconcile State Farm and Baltimore Gas & Electric, see Shapiro & Levy, supra note 30, at 432 n.215.
239. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 204, at 470; Smith, supra note 210, at 454.
241. Cf Strauss, supra note 213, at 1134 ("It may indeed be that agency inaction is the price of
hard-look review, and a higher one than we should choose to pay.").
242. See Levy & Glicksman, JudicialActivism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REv. - (forthcoming, 1989) (arguing that ideas of judicial
restraint have not prevented Supreme Court from pursuing a pro-development environmental
policy).
243. See Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts'Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1833 (1978) ("I believe that, in practice, the reviewing standards courts apply
often reflect unarticulated assumptions about, or attitudes toward, the substantive aspects of the
subject matter being reviewed."); Cass, supra note 229, at 252-56; Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 224 ("I am not
bothered overmuch by the undoubted truth that a reviewing court is more likely to take a charitable
view toward error in subsidiary findings when it sympathizes with the agency's end result, than when
it does not."); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 30, at 439; cf Posner, What Am I? A PottedPlant? The
Case Against Strict Constructionism, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23 ("At no time have the
courts behaved consistently with the idea that there is a political sphere, where the people rule, and
there is a domain of fixed rights, administered but not created or altered by judges.").
244. Spaeth & Teger, Activism and Restraint: A Cloak for the Justices' Policy Preferences, in
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 277, 296-97 (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. 1982) (statistical study reveals that Supreme Court Justices are inconsistent in application of restraint and activism depending on issue in each case and identity of the parties); see Note, All The President'sMen?:
A Study ofRonald Reagan'sAppointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766,
789 (1987) (statistical analysis indicates that Republican judicial appointees take liberal side in 36%
of civil cases and Democratic judicial appointees take liberal side in 63% of civil cases); Karpay,
Bork or No Bork, GOP Bloc a Force on D.C. Circuit, Legal Times, Jan. 18, 1988, at 10 (statistics
indicate that when Republican and Democratic D.C. Circuit judges disagree, they tend to vote with
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One final problem caused by the adoption of executive implementation review relates to Congress's adoption of alternative models of delegation. If Congress becomes fully aware of the Court's shift to executive
implementation review,2 45 it may conclude that the only way to limit
agency discretion is to abandon the discretionary model of delegated
power, since the courts will no longer actively ensure that agencies adhere to congressional intent. On the surface, then, executive implementation review seems well-designed to create incentives for desirable
legislative changes, such as adopting more detailed statutes. But, as already demonstrated, 24 6 the alternative models will not always provide
appropriate solutions to the problem of administrative discretion. If the
Supreme Court continues to favor executive implementation review,
Congress may feel compelled to resort to the alternative models even
when those models are clearly ill-advised (such as when Congress lacks
the expertise to fashion detailed legislation). Congress may feel that the
only, and unacceptable, alternative to the new models is delegating uncontrollable discretion to the agency.
Congress need not allow the Court to paint it into such a corner.
Instead, Congress can, through a series of statutory amendments, force
the courts to readopt some elements of checks and balances review. This
selective reinvigoration of checks and balances review will leave Congress
with a full set of options. Congress can resort to one of the alternative
models when appropriate, while employing discretionary delegations
when the alternative models seem ill-advised. By reestablishing some of
the components of checks and balances review, Congress can feel confident that the courts will apply constraints to agency discretion when
other judges of their party affiliation). But cf. id. (83% of decisions in D.C. Circuit were
unanimous).
245. Some indirect evidence of such a connection does exist. Congress was painfully aware, for
example, of the effect of Chadha on its authority to control agency discretion. See Biden, Who
Needs the Legislative Veto?, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685, 686 (1984) (Congressional response to
Chadha was "near panic."). After Chadha, legislators considered various alternatives, including a
constitutional amendment authorizing the veto, see, eg., S.J. Res. 135, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in ConstitutionalAmendment to Restore the Legislative Veto: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.J Res. 135, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4
(1984); H.R.J. Res. 313, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced, 129 CONG. REc. H4895 (daily ed. June
30, 1983), and legislation requiring that no major regulation become law until Congress has had an
opportunity to pass a law overriding it, see, eg., S. 1650, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a), 129 CONG.
REC. S10,474 (daily ed. July 20, 1983). These approaches have died out, however, and have been
replaced by the use of stricter models of delegating authority. Finally, one can speculate that, even if
members of Congress did not focus on the effects of the Court's adoption of restraint-oriented review, the Court's efforts prompted environmental interest groups to support legislation delegating
less discretion to the EPA.
246. See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
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Congress is unable to provide them. 247
D. Reform of JudicialReview.

This section will outline a series of recommendations for legislative
reestablishment of checks and balances review. These recommendations
affect hybrid rulemaking, standing, jurisdiction for review of agency decisions, private rights of action, and the scope of judicial review.
1. Hybrid Rulemaking. The debate over the merits of hybrid
procedures has been raging for years24 8 and has split the Congress. A

few years ago the Senate passed legislation that would have effectively
reversed the Supreme Court's judgment that the APA does not require
hybrid rulemaking, but the proposal died in the House. 249 Congress can

evaluate the arguments made in that debate by reviewing the experiences
of the agencies now required to use hybrid rulemaking. On this basis, it
can determine whether hybrid procedures help to clarify a rulemaking

record on the resolution of specific questions of fact. If hybrid procedures have this clarifying effect, they will facilitate both legislative over247. Some commentators have opposed any return to judicial activism because it would reduce
the pressure on Congress to control agency discretion. See, eg., Pierce, supra note 204, at 484-85.
We recommend, however, that only some aspects of restraint-oriented review be changed. The aspects retained would continue to provide incentives for Congress to enact specific legislation. A
return to more active judicial review poses another problem, however. As Professor Strauss has
demonstrated, the Supreme Court has a more difficult time policing lower-court decisions when
courts engage in activist review. See Strauss, supra note 213, at 1126-29. He argues that the Court's
preference for restraint-oriented review reflects a desire to eliminate the potential for circuit court
conflicts, which impede the national application of agency decisions. Id. at 1105. Professor Strauss
seems to admit, however, that this problem does not seem like an adequate reason to retain the
objectionable aspects of restraint-oriented review. See id. at 1114 (it is misleading to fault agencies,
in view of Supreme Court's limited resources, for not securing a prompt national resolution of
problems.).
248. Critics contend that hybrid procedures create delay and costs without improving the quality of decisionmaking. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 101, at 732 (formal procedures generally
inappropriate to resolve scientific issues that are resolved on a policy basis); Williams, "Hybrid
Rulemaking" under the Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U. CM.
L. REV. 401, 436 (1975). Supporters counter that hybrid rulemaking is appropriate where agency
decisions require the evaluation of particular and specific data. See, eg., Shapiro, Scientific Issues
and the Function ofHearingProcedures: EvaluatingFDA's PublicBoard ofInquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J.
288, 298. The Administrative Conference has opposed any across-the-board requirement of hybrid
procedures, but it has endorsed the use of hybrid rulemaking when there is a "special reason" for its
adoption. Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, I C.F.R. § 305.72-5
(1988).
249. Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2-3, 128 CONG. REC.
2374-75 (1982) (proposing to amend 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553 (1982)). The bill, which passed the Senate
by a 94-0 vote, 128 CONG. REC. 5297 (1982), but was not voted upon by the House, called for
"informal public hearings," including direct and cross-examination of witnesses, for any rule having
a substantial economic effect, See id. § 3, 128 CONG. REC. at 2374.
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sight and judicial review of agency decisions, and thus will make agencies
more accountable for their decisionmaking.
2. StandingRights. Congress should also consider amending section 702 of the APA to modify or eliminate the Court's prudential limita2 50
tions on standing. The Constitution does not compel these limitations,
and the Court has indicated that it will not apply them when Congress
clearly indicates that certain persons who satisfy the minimum constitutional requirements have standing. 25 1 Congress could therefore endorse
the zone of interest test, but prohibit the courts from applying the other
prudential limitations. This step would increase the number of persons
eligible to challenge agency action and thus would expand opportunities
for judicial supervision of agencies' adherence to legislative constraints.
Statutory reduction or elimination of the prudential limitations
would increase the number of challenges to agency decisions that courts
must decide on the merits. For two reasons, this potential increase in
litigation should not cause Congress to refrain from amending section

250. The Court currently limits standing by applying several prudential tests that are not constitutionally compelled. See, eg., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 497 U.S. 388, 400 & n.16 (1987)
(zone of interest test created by Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970), is gloss on 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982)); see also supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. Professor Winter has convincingly argued that the entire doctrine of standing is inappropriate. He
argues that the so-called constitutional component of standing is a relatively recent judicial invention
because the Framers, the first Congresses, and Supreme Court until the 20th century were "oblivious
to the modem conception ... that standing is a component of the constitutional phrase 'cases or
controversies.'" Winter, supra note 150, at 1374. Winter also asserts that when the Court adopted
its present approach to standing, it misconceived the doctrine as an extension of "private" law, in
which typically one party has caused some harm to another. As he points out, the Court once
broadly conceptualized standing to include a "public rights model." See id. at 1395. This model
allowed any citizen with information about allegedly unlawful government action to challenge that
action even if it injured no person more than another. See id. at 1394-95. Unless the Court revises
its reading of article III, however, Congress can enlarge standing only by removing the existing
prudential limitations that courts have imposed.
251. See, eg., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3612 (1982), which allows enforcement of rights by private persons, extended standing to
the limits of article III, with the consequence that "courts accordingly lack the authority to create
prudential barriers to standing in suits brought under that section."). The lower courts have interpreted these decisions as eliminating, or at least limiting, prudential limitations on standing for persons specifically designated in an agency's enabling act as having a right to seek judicial review of the
agency's decisions. See, eg., Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1336 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (broad standing established by EPCA removes need to limit judicial review for prudential
reasons); Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (FTCIA permits
standing to extent permitted by article III), affid mem., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). Moreover, the
Supreme Court itself has applied some of the prudential limitations in a manner less restrictive of
standing rights when it has been able to infer congressional intent to authorize specific persons to
seek review of agency decisions. See Clarke, 497 U.S. at 399-40 & n.14.
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First, article III-based standing requirements, which would still
apply, would filter out suits not presenting a case or controversy. Second, the judiciary would retain its power to eliminate nonmeritorious
claims by summary judgment. Congress ought to require the courts to
hear cases that survive summary judgment, because judicial review under
those circumstances promotes agency accountability to legislative
limitations.
702.252

3. Jurisdictionfor Review. Congress may also want to clarify its
intent concerning the federal courts' jurisdiction to review cases of
agency inaction. The best solution would be to repeal the APA's "committed to agency discretion" provision. 2 53 Under this approach, all
agency decisions would be reviewable unless the congressional mandate
to the agency in question prohibited review. 254 Heckler itself provides
arguments against such an amendment, 255 but, as Professor Sunstein has
argued, the Heckler Court's analysis is generally unpersuasive. 256 Elimi252. Critics of prudential limitations argue that courts need not use the limitations to manage
their workload. These critics contend that litigation costs are normally so high that no person will
challenge an agency decision unless she has a sincere and significant interest in reversing the decision. See, e.g., Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REv.
645, 673-74 (1973) (plaintiff must feel strongly enough to pay the bills, and magnitude of bills
reduces flood of litigation and gives partial measure of plaintiff's "stake" in outcome). Supporters of
the limitations counter that the limitations are important in controlling access to the courts by public
interest groups. They contend that while such groups may represent persons injured by an agency's
decision, they are often motivated by ideological concerns that far outweigh the actual injury as a
reason for mounting a lawsuit. See, eg., Nichol, Injury and the Disintegrationof Article III, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1915, 1927 (1986). But see Winter, supra note 150, at 1508 (arguing that Court
should apply multi-faceted conception of standing that includes public rights model of adjudication).
253. 5 U.S.C. § 7021(a)(2) (1982).
254. Under the law prior to Heckler, the Court immunized agency decisions from review whenever statutes were "drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 657 (1985)
(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (in turn quoting
S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. 26 (1945))). Professor Sunstein has pointed out that the
"committed to agency discretion" test creates a needlessly confusing threshold inquiry into whether
there is "law to apply," which requires courts to use a multifactor balancing test that can easily lead
to erroneous results. See Sunstein, supra note 208, at 478. Eliminating section 701(a)(2) would lead
to the same substantive result as applying the pre-Heckler interpretation of the section. Where Congress has established legislative constraints relevant to an agency's decisions, courts would review the
decisions for compliance with those constraints. If there is "no law to apply," there would be no
applicable statutory constraint on the agency and its decisions, which, if otherwise lawful, would be
affirmed. See id.
255. The Heckler Court asserted that decisions not to prosecute or enforce are generally unsuitable for review because they involve significant agency expertise, they do not involve coercive powers
over an individual's liberty or property rights, and they share the characteristics of a decision
whether to indict a person, which has always been considered the special province of the executive
branch. 470 U.S. at 831-32.
256. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 254, at 665-75. Professor Sunstein argues that the Court's
"analogy to the discretion of the criminal prosecutor is largely unavailing" because review to con-
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nating APA section 701(a)(2) would elevate the value of checks and balances review over the Court's preference for executive implementation
257
review.
4. Express Private Rights of Action. Congress should also consider whether to overrule, on an agency-by-agency basis, the Supreme

Court's elimination of implied private rights of action. 258 Congress has
established express private rights of action in most pollution control statutes2 59 and it could create similar private rights of action in other statutes.260 If Congress chose this reform, it would need to assess, statute by
statute, whether private rights of action would produce more benefits
than detriments. 261 In general, however, such rights may have a place in
sider whether the executive is acting in accordance with noncriminal laws promotes rather than
contradicts the separation of powers. Id. at 674. He finds the "coerciveness" distinction unpersuasive because "unlawful governmental failure to act can be as harmful as unlawful action and is
equally subject to judicial review under APA standards." Id. at 674-75. Finally, he argues that
"while inaction may not involve traditional property or liberty interests, the existence of a constitutionally protected interest is not a necessary predicate for the invocation of judicial review." Id. at
675.
Professor Davis argues that Heckler was incorrect because even if Congress has not established
statutory constraints on agency action, the APA requires a court to determine whether a decision is
an "abuse of discretion" by applying "such ever present standards as 'justice,' 'fairness,' and 'reasonableness' that necessarily guide all judicial action." Davis, "No Law to Apply," 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1, 4 (1988). He contends that "the question whether the agency has abused its discretion is a
matter for judicial discretion, in whole or in part," id. at 9 (emphasis in original deleted), and, for
that reason, "law to apply is not generally a prerequisite to judicial review of administrative action,"
id. at 10 (emphasis in original deleted). This interpretation serves the purposes of checks and balances review by requiring that every agency action, unless Congress has expressly immunized it from
review, be subject to a requirement of "reasonableness." See id. at 7. If Congress amends the APA,
it can determine whether to endorse Professor Davis's understanding of its intent.
257. If Congress does not want to broadly overrule Heckler by legislation, it should consider
whether to establish judicial review of some agency decisions not to act. Congress can overcome the
Heckler presumption by enacting substantive guidelines for the exercise of enforcement powers or by
rulemaking on an agency-by-agency basis.
258. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
259. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982) (CAA's authorization of private actions against polluters
under specified conditions). See generally Timbers & Wirth, PrivateRights of Action and Judicial
Review in FederalEnvironmentalLaw, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 403, 405-06 (1985) (discussing other
private rights of action under environmental laws).
260. These provisions, like those in the environmental laws, could authorize suits both against
persons alleged to have violated statutes and against agencies alleged to have breached nondiscretionary duties. Both categories of suits could enhance legislative control over the agencies. By authorizing private suits directly against individual violators, Congress would provide a vehicle for
augmenting agency enforcement resources and protecting statutory beneficiaries whom agencies
have failed to protect. These private suits would augment agency appropriations as a way to implement substantive statutory requirements. By authorizing private suits against a recalcitrant agency,
Congress could provide a direct mechanism for redressing the agency's failure to comply with its
legislative mandate. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
261. See Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975) (offering economic analysis of choice among exclusive private enforcement, exclusive public enforcement,
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solving the problem of accountability under the discretionary model of

legislative delegation.
5. Substantive Protections. A final reform would involve amending the APA's scope of review requirements. If the courts construe
Chevron to require extreme deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes, Congress should reestablish a checks and balances approach for the
reasons set forth above. 2 62 Congress could enact the Restatement of
Scope-of-Review Doctrine endorsed by the American Bar Association's
Section of Administrative Law. This restatement provides that "[t]he
court is the primary authority" concerning statutory interpretation, but

"it shall give appropriate weight to an agency's views concerning those
issues. '2 63 In determining "whether and to what extent an agency interpretation deserves weight," a court would be "guided by such factors as
the timing and consistency of the agency's position and the nature of the
''2
agency's expertise. 6

Congress might likewise find it useful to amend the APA to clarify
the scope of review for agency policy decisions. Again, the ABA Restatement would be a good basis for such legislation. The Restatement

requires a court to set aside an agency's action if the action satisfies any
of eight specific criteria, which are designed to indicate fundamental fail-

ures in the agency's evidence or reasoning process. 265 Several of these
and shared public and private enforcement); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 173, at 1289-322 (discussing benefits and detriments of private rights of action).
262. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text (Chevron may be too deferential to agency
interpretation of statutes); see also Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An AdministrativeLaw
Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 268 (1986) (opposing relegation of courts to "a decidedly
secondary position even on purely legal issues").
263. Section of Admin. Law, ABA, A Restatement of Scope-of-Review Doctrine (Feb. 8, 1986),
reprinted in 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 235, 236 (1986).
264. Id., reprinted in 38 ADMIN. L. REv. at 236.
265. Under the ABA interpretation, agency action should be set aside when:
(I) The action exceeds the authority by, or violates limitations imposed by(A) the Constitution;
(3) a federal statute;
(C) an agency rule having the force of law;
(D) federal common law;
(E) any other source of law that is binding upon the agency.
(2) The agency has relied on factors that may not be taken into account under, or has
ignored factors that must be taken into account under [the Constitution, federal statutes,
agency rules, or federal common law].
(3) The action rests upon a policy judgment that is so unacceptable as to render the
action arbitrary.
(4) The action rests upon reasoning that is so illogical as to render the action arbitrary.
(5) The asserted or necessary factual premises of the action do not withstand scrutiny
under the [scope of review applied to formal or informal proceedings].
(6) The action is, without good reason, inconsistent with prior agency policies or
precedents.
(7) The agency arbitrarily failed to adopt an alternative solution to the problem addressed in the action.
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factors resemble the criteria adopted in State Farm to determine whether
266
an agency's decision is supported by adequate reasons.
Amending the APA to indicate specifically when agency action is
arbitrary and capricious would also respond to the charge that heightened scrutiny invites judges to replace agencies' policy views with their
own. An APA amendment would clarify the deferential nature of the
standards of review. 267 Most importantly, the amendment would make
clear that the proper focus for review is not the result reached by an
agency, but the reasons supporting that result. 268
CONCLUSION

Congress has recently done what many observers thought impossible. It has imposed a variety of constraints on the EPA and, in a few
instances, on other agencies, by adopting approaches to legislation that
vary from the traditional vague agency mandate. At the same time, the
Supreme Court has swung away from activist review of agency decisions
and has adopted a more restrained approach. Congress's movement
away from discretionary delegations is a rational legislative reaction to
the Court's shift. If the judiciary is no longer willing to control agency
discretion through activist review, Congress may have little choice but to
narrow the agencies' discretion by changing the nature of statutory
delegations.
Remarkably, there may be no connection between these judicial and
congressional trends. Very little evidence exists that Congress has acted
in response to the Court's recent decisions. Instead, Congress seems to
have been motivated by the EPA's failure to meet legislative expectations. 2 69 Congress apparently has not yet realized the connection be(8) The action fails in other respects to rest upon reasoned decisionmaking.
Id., reprinted in 38 ADMIN. L. REV. at 235.
266. Compare supra text accompanying notes 201-03 (State Farm criteria) with supra note 265
(ABA Committee's criteria).
267. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that State Farm requires deferential review, the
Court's analysis in that and other cases has garbled the message. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. Amending the APA would send a clear signal that agency decisions cannot be overturned except when there is a clear failure in the agency's evidence or reasoning process.
268. This distinction is important because it reminds judges that they may not substitute their
policy choices for an agency's and that an agency's reasoning may withstand scrutiny even if a judge
disagrees with the result. Moreover, the focus on the agency's reasoning process allows judges to
acknowledge agency expertise where appropriate. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 30, at 437.
269. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. But see Muskie, supra note 14, at 10,083

("Congress has even anticipated the judicial disinclination to interfere with administrative discretion,
enacting 'hammer' provisions to force [the] EPA to carry out congressional policy."); see also Florio,
supra note 14, at 378 (Judicial oversight of hazardous waste legislation in the early 1980s "fell
short.").
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tween its recent innovations and the Court's new restraint-oriented
review.
When Congress realizes this connection, it may reassert control over
agencies through adoption of coercive, prescriptive, or ministerial legislation. Such control is beneficial, provided Congress is aware of the alternative models' limitations.
Rather than blindly abandoning
discretionary delegations in all situations, Congress should impose constraints on agency discretion through selective reestablishment of checks
and balances judicial review, which will permit Congress to enact discretionary legislation when necessary without losing control over agencies.

